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ABSTRACT
Chen, Peng-Chu. Ph.D., Purdue University, August 2016. Systemic Risk in Financial
Networks. Major Professor: Thomas Morin.
This thesis extends the literature of systemic risk in financial networks in two
directions.
First, we develop a majorization-based tool to compare financial networks in terms
of systemic losses with a focus on the implications of liability concentration. Specif-
ically, we quantify liability concentration by applying the majorization order to the
liability matrix that captures the interconnectedness of banks in a financial network.
We develop notions of balancing and unbalancing networks to bring out the qualita-
tively different implications of liability concentration on the system’s loss profile. An
empirical analysis of the network formed by the banking sectors of eight represen-
tative European countries suggests that the system is either unbalancing or close to
it. This empirical finding, along with the majorization results, supports regulatory
policies aiming at limiting the size of gross exposures to individual counterparties.
Second, we propose a multi-period clearing framework, where the level of systemic
risk is mitigated through provision of liquidity assistance. The interbank liability net-
work evolves stochastically over time, and assets of defaulted banks are sold to qual-
ified banks within the network through a first-price sealed-bid auction. We find that
policies targeting systemically important banks are more effective in core-periphery
network structures, whereas those maximizing the total liquidity in the system are
preferred in random network configurations. We assess sensitivity of systemic risk to
variations in interbank liabilities as well as to their correlation structure.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Financial institutions are connected to each other via a sophisticated network
of multilateral exposures. Through these linkages, distress or failure of a financial
institution triggering large unexpected losses on its trades can seriously affect the fi-
nancial status of its counterparties. It is such negative externalities and the significant
spillovers to the real economy that are the essence of systemic risk, see also [Caru-
ana(2010)] and [Markose et al.(2012)].
The intricate structure of linkages can be naturally captured via a network rep-
resentation of the financial system. Such a network models the interlinking expo-
sures between financial institutions, and can thus assist in detecting important shock
transmission mechanisms. This is also stressed by [Allen and Babus(2008)], who
discuss how the use of network theories can enrich our understanding of financial
systems, helping to answer questions related to how resilient financial networks are
to contagion, and how financial institutions form connections when exposed to risk
of contagion. Such a machinery becomes even more relevant if we consider the cur-
rent post-crisis regime, where a series of decisions are being taken by governmental
authorities to better monitor systemically important entities.
Starting with the seminal paper by [Allen and Gale(2001)], who employed an equi-
librium approach to model the propagation of financial distress in a credit network,
many other approaches have recently been proposed to explain systemic risk. [Gai
and Kapadia(2010)] use statistical techniques from network theory to model how
contagion spreads, and analyze how the knock-on effects of distress at some financial
institutions can force other entities to write down the value of their assets. [Battiston
et al.(2012a)] introduce the financial accelerator to characterize the feedback effect
2arising from changes in the financial conditions of an agent. [Battiston et al.(2012b)]
demonstrate that systemic risk does not necessarily decrease if the connectivity of the
underlying financial network increases.
This thesis belongs to the stream of literature generated from the seminal work
of [Eisenberg and Noe(2001)], who developed a clearing system framework consistent
with bankruptcy law, to analyze systemic risk in interbank networks. To be more spe-
cific, they consider a financial network consisting of n nodes which represent financial
institutions. For each node i, let li,j be the amount of liabilities owed by i to j, ci the
value of outside (non-interbank) assets held by node i, and p∗i the clearing payments
made by node i to repay its liabilities. p∗i must satisfy the conditions imposed by
bankruptcy law which include proportional repayments of liabilities, limited liability,


















p∗j + ci︸ ︷︷ ︸
node i’s total assets including
payments received by i and





[Eisenberg and Noe(2001)] propose the fictitious default algorithm to solve the above
fixed point equations iteratively. It first determines the payments made by each
node i, assuming that all of node i’s debtors repay in full. If all nodes meet their
liabilities, then the algorithm terminates and the clearing payment vector equals
the total liability vector; otherwise, the set of defaulted nodes is identified and the
payment vector is updated. The algorithm continues until the payment vector satisfies
the above equation. Then, each node i’s exposure to the systemic risk is measured
as the number of iterations needed for node i to default. The fewer iterations node i
needs, the more systemic risk node i is exposed to.
Such a framework was utilized and extended along several directions. [Staum and
Liu(2012)] analyze how systemic risk in financial networks should be quantified and
allocated to individual institutions. [Rogers and Veraart(2013)] relax the assumption
made in [Eisenberg and Noe(2001)] that a defaulting bank can liquidate its assets at
3face value to repay due liabilities, and identify circumstances under which banks have
incentives to rescue others. [Blanchet and Shi(2012)] consider a financial network with
insurance and reinsurance companies, and provide a model to capture the total losses
generated from default cascades originated from a reinsurance company. [Elliott et
al.(2013)] study the impact of diversification and integration of a financial network on
cascades of default events. On a more empirical side, [Cont et al.(2013)] and [Angelini
et al.(1996)] analyze, respectively, Brazilian and Italian interbank systems, showing
how defaults transmit through the payment system and originate systemic crisis.
For ease of terminology, throughout the thesis we will use “financial system” and
“financial network” interchangeably and refer to its comprising entities as “financial
institutions”, “banks” or “nodes”.
1.2 Contributions of the Thesis
The main contributions of this thesis are
• Development of a majorization-based tool to compare financial networks with
different levels of liability concentration. We apply the majorization order to the
liability matrix to quantify liability concentration. The notions of balancing and
unbalancing networks are introduced to highlight the implications of liability
concentration on the system’s loss profiles, depending on the capitalization level
of the network.
We provide numerical examples of financial networks with empirically driven
structures, such as perfect and imperfect tiering schemes. We conduct an em-
pirical analysis of the network formed by the banking sectors of eight represen-
tative European countries. The analysis reveals that such a financial system is
always either unbalancing or close to it. Together with the theoretical results,
this empirical finding supports regulatory policies put forward by Basel Com-
mittee to limit the size of gross exposures to individual counterparties. These
4results are presented in Chapter 2 and have been published in the INFORMS
journal Operations Research (see [Capponi et al.(2015)]).
• Analysis of systemic risk mitigation policies. We propose a novel multi-period
clearing framework, where the lender of last resort is introduced to mitigate
the level of systemic risk through provision of liquidity assistance. Over time,
the interbank liability network evolves stochastically. When a bank defaults,
its assets are sold to qualified entities within the network through a first-price
sealed-bid auction.
We measure the systemic risk reduction obtained by different mitigation poli-
cies. The simulation results show that policies maximizing the total liquidity
reduce larger systemic risk in random network configurations, whereas those
targeting systemically important banks are preferred in core-periphery network
structures. Both types of policies become more effective when the variations
in interbank liabilities increase or the correlation between interbank liabilities
decreases. These results are presented in Chapter 3 and have been published in
the finance journal Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (see [Capponi
and Chen(2015)]).
Chapter 4 summarizes the main results. The technical proofs of the results in
Chapter 2 and 3 are delegated to the appendices.
5CHAPTER 2. LIABILITY CONCENTRATION AND SYSTEMIC
LOSSES IN FINANCIAL NETWORKS
2.1 Introduction
The financial industry is fraught with cases of bank failures due to large exposures
to certain counterparties. One such example is Johnson Matthey Bankers in the
United Kingdom in 1984. Bank assets more than doubled between 1980 and 1984,
and loans became concentrated only to a few borrowers, including Mahmoud Sipra,
Rajendra Sethia and ESAL Commodities, and Abdul Shamji. The quality of some
of these loans turned out to be worse than expected, and Bank of England had to
intervene to prevent a financial crisis. Another example is the Korean banking system
during the crisis in the late 1990s, when the country’s bank assets were concentrated
on five largest banks. These cases have prompted regulatory authorities in recent years
to impose limits on banks’ exposures. For example, the Core Principles for Effective
Banking Supervision (Core Principle 19) sets prudent limits on large exposures to a
single borrower.
The goal of this chapter is to develop an analytical framework to assess how
concentration of liabilities affects the exposures towards individual entities, and in
turn induces losses in a financial system. Our starting point is the basic model
of [Eisenberg and Noe(2001)], enhanced with bankruptcy costs as in [Glasserman and
Young(2015)], which captures the interlinking exposures among financial institutions.
The model yields the loss contributed by each node (bank) in the network, computed
as the difference between its total liability and payment. We then use the majorization
order ( [Arnold et al.(2011)]) among vectors to express preferences between losses, i.e.
one loss profile (vector) is preferred to another only if it is majorized by the latter.
This allows us to capture the desired preference via a broad class of functions known
6as Schur convex functions ( [Arnold et al.(2011)]), which preserve the majorization
order. Such a class includes functions such as summation and max; thus, a loss profile
is preferred to another if it results in a smaller total loss or a smaller worst-case loss.
More importantly, we use matrix majorization to compare relative liability ma-
trices in terms of concentration of liabilities. When the relative liability matrix of
network a is majorized by the corresponding matrix of network b, it means that in
network a the interbank liabilities are more evenly distributed across the nodes in the
network, as compared with b, where the liabilities are more concentrated. (Refer to
Figure 2.1, where the relative liability matrix of the network on the left is majorized
by the one on the right, in both upper and lower panels.)
In addition, we develop two new notions of financial networks, referred to as
balancing and unbalancing. Note, the two notions are not orthogonal to each other,
notwithstanding what their names may suggest. Both notions are defined in terms
of the primitive data from the financial network; in particular, they both concern the
pre-clearing equity position of the banks (nodes), with respect to their liabilities. The
balancing notion is defined in terms of the base-liability configuration, i.e., assuming
all nodes will pay their full liabilities; in which case, it stipulates that a node with a
smaller liability is associated with a larger equity. This, of course, needs not be the
case post-clearing, as some nodes might default. The unbalancing notion, instead, is
defined in terms of a (minimally) reduced level of liability, which guarantees that all
nodes will make full payment at clearing, and stipulates that a node with a smaller
liability has a smaller equity. Thus, in an unbalancing system, a node with a smaller
liability is more likely to default, and so does a node with a larger liability in a
balancing system. (Both are the consequence of a smaller equity before clearing.)
Liability concentration has a knock-on effect when compounded with balancing
and unbalancing systems. A high concentration of liability means that a node with
a large (small) liability will receive more (less) payments relative to the case of low
concentration. For example, when a balancing system is coupled with a lower con-
centration (of liability), a node with a larger liability tends to receive less payments
7and thus incurs a larger loss. Moreover, a low concentration means that the payment
flows among the nodes are more uniform; hence, the loss at one node is more likely to
propagate to its neighboring nodes, and their neighboring nodes, and so forth. Thus,
the low concentration implies a (potentially) more serious systemic consequence in
the balancing case. In an unbalancing system, on the other hand, a higher liability
concentration will yield the similar systemic consequence. In this case, a node with
a smaller liability will tend to receive less payments, resulting in a larger loss. Since
liabilities are more concentrated, the loss induced by a defaulted bank will have to
be absorbed by a smaller number of its creditors, which may induce more defaults;
hence, the contagion effect.
Our results are related to [Amini et al.(2010)], who show that a network with
higher concentration of exposures is less resilient to shocks. In their framework, the
loss incurred by the creditors of each node does not depend on the interbank liability
structure. Rather it is given by the exposure of the creditor to the defaulted node
multiplied by an exogenously specified loss given default rate. Moreover, their analysis
is performed asymptotically as the number of institutions grows to infinity.
We use consolidated banking sector data of the eight largest European countries,
consisting of balance sheet data and interbank exposures, to investigate the state of
the network. Our analysis reveals that it is either unbalancing or close to it (see Ta-
ble 2.3 for details) persistently over different time periods. These empirical findings,
along with the above discussed theoretical results, support regulatory policies of the
Basel Committee ( [BCBS(2014)]) aiming at limiting the size of gross exposures to
individual counterparties. Moreover, our results add to the understanding of preven-
tive policies in bringing out their consequences and implications on the network. The
regulator will monitor the interbank system and limit gross exposures toward banks
that have small capital. In an unbalancing system, banks with smaller outstanding
liabilities will incur larger losses. Hence, reducing gross exposures to them means to
push banks with larger liabilities to lend less to those with smaller liabilities, making
the matrix of interbank liabilities less concentrated and driving the network closer to
8a balancing state. When this transition happens, banks with larger outstanding lia-
bilities will suffer larger losses. The regulator would then need to incentivize them to
lend more to banks with smaller liabilities. This will reduce the net exposure of banks
with smaller liabilities to those with large liabilities, and thereby make liabilities more
concentrated.
A brief overview of related literature is in order. Most studies on interbank net-
works have focused on understanding the impact of shocks, originating in a specific
part of the network, on the overall financial system. [Allen and Gale(2001)] employ
an equilibrium approach to model the propagation of financial distress in a credit net-
work. [Gai and Kapadia(2010)] model how contagion spreads in a random network,
and analyze the knock-on effects of distress. [Battiston et al.(2012a)] and [Battiston
et al.(2012b)] characterize feedback effects arising from changing financial conditions
of the network nodes. [Capponi and Chen(2015)] develop a multi-period extension
of the Eisenberg-Noe model, and analyze the impact of different mitigation poli-
cies. [Rogers and Veraart(2013)] improve the realism of the [Eisenberg and Noe(2001)]
model by including liquidation costs at default. [Elsinger et al.(2006)] distinguish be-
tween fundamental and contagious defaults in the [Eisenberg and Noe(2001)] frame-
work, and analyze feedback and domino effects via an empirical analysis. [Glasser-
man and Young(2015)] show that, under a wide range of shock distributions, the
contagion effects via network spillovers are usually small for realistic interbank net-
works. [Furfine(2003)] provides an empirical analysis quantifying contagion risk re-
sulting from interbank federal funds exposures data. [Haldane and May(2011)] draw
analogies with ecosystems and analyze how growth in interbank claims leads to insta-
bility. Other studies have explored the relation between the topological structure of
the network and the magnitude of defaults it experiences. [Gai et al.(2011)] analyze
the degree to which networks with a smaller number of key strongly interconnected
players is affected by target shocks. [Elliott et al.(2013)] discuss the dependence of
the probability of default cascades on integration and diversification. [Acemoglu et
al.(2015)] develop a theoretical framework to explain the robust-yet-fragile tendency
9of financial networks. On the empirical side, [Cont et al.(2013)] and [Angelini et
al.(1996)] analyze, respectively, Brazilian and Italian interbank systems, and show
how contagion through the payment system can originate systemic crisis.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We start with preliminaries on
both the Eisenberg-Noe model and the majorization order in Section 2.2, and for-
malize the notion of a loss profile and loss preference in a financial network. We
then spell out in Section 2.3 the technical details in modeling a) the concentration of
liabilities using matrix majorization, and b) the notion of balancing versus unbalanc-
ing networks and their implications on loss preference. Section 2.4 presents concrete
examples to illustrate and enhance the notions of balancing and unbalancing systems.
In particular, we make connections to the studies on German and Italian banks re-
spectively presented in [Craig and Von Peter(2014)] and in [Fricke and Lux(2015)],
where a tiering (or, core-periphery) structure has been identified as the primary con-
figuration of interbank liabilities. We apply the balancing/unbalancing notions to the
tiering structure and bring out the distinction between perfect and imperfect tiering
schemes. Section 2.5 provides an empirical analysis of the network induced by the
eight largest European banking sectors and develops policy implications. Proofs of
technical results are delegated to Appendix A.
2.2 Loss Preferences
We describe the majorization method used to express loss preferences in Section
2.2.1. We recall the Eisenberg-Noe framework enhanced with bankruptcy costs in
Section 2.2.2. We describe the objective of the study in Section 2.2.3.
2.2.1 Loss Comparison Using Majorization
We start by providing basic notations and definitions related to majorization and
refer to [Arnold et al.(2011)] for a complete treatment of the subject.
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Majorization is a preorder on vectors of real numbers, which measures the disper-
sion among the elements in a vector. For any vector x ∈ Rn, we use x[1], . . . , x[n] to
denote the ordered entries of x from largest to smallest (x[1] being the largest and x[n]
the smallest). Moreover, we use x(1), . . . , x(n) to denote the ordered entries of x from
smallest to largest (x(1) being the smallest and x(n) the largest).


























x ≺ y indicates that the vector x is more evenly distributed than y. Replacing
the equality in Eq. (2.1) and (2.2) with ≤ and ≥ respectively leads to the notion of
weak submajorization and weak supermajorization.







y[i] for k = 1, . . . , n.






y(i) for k = 1, . . . , n.
Interchangeably, we denote x w y if y ≺w x and x w y if y ≺w x.
We next explain how we express preferences between losses using majorization.
Let x ∈ Rn be a vector, whose i-th component xi is interpreted as the loss generated
by entity i in a financial network. We say that the loss vector x is preferred to the
loss vector y if x ≺w y. Our choice is driven by the following consideration. Consider
two networks a and b consisting of the same set of entities. We now think of x as
the loss vector associated with network a and of y as the loss vector associated with
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network b. The difference between a and b lies in the interbank structure. If, for
any k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the sum of the k largest losses generated by entities in network a
never exceeds the corresponding quantity in network b, then we prefer the interbank
network a to b. In particular, this means that the maximum loss generated by a
node in the network a does not exceed the maximum loss generated by a node in
the network b (k = 1). Further, it also implies that the total loss in the network a
never exceeds the corresponding quantity in the network b (k = n). Our preference
criterion is also related to the monitoring mechanism proposed by [Duffie(2011)],
where each systemically important entity is suggested to report the identities of the
ten counterparties against which it has the largest gains or losses, under a set of
stressful scenarios. While in [Duffie(2011)] the regulator is interested in monitoring
losses on an individual basis, i.e. separately for each bank, in our case he would
be concerned about the aggregate loss generated by those banks with the k highest
shortfalls.
Notice that our objective is to measure the size of losses, and not in which specific
nodes of the network they occurred. This property is preserved when weak sub-
majorization is used to express preferences. Recall that weak submajorization is a
preorder, i.e. x ≺w y and y ≺w x together imply that x = yP for some permutation
matrix P, but not that x = y. Hence, a permutation of the loss vector is equally
preferred to the original loss vector.
2.2.2 The Eisenberg-Noe Framework with Bankruptcy Costs
We define the loss vector associated with a financial system using an extended
Eisenberg-Noe model, where losses due to bankruptcy are modeled as in [Glasserman
and Young(2015)]. We consider a network of interbank liabilities consisting of n
nodes, where each node represents a financial institution. Let L ∈ Rn×n≥0 be the
interbank liability matrix with li,j denoting the amount of liabilities owed by i to j,
and c ∈ R1×n≥0 be the outside asset vector, in which each component ci represents the
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value of outside assets held by node i. Each node also has liabilities towards entities
which are not part of the interbank network. More specifically, we let e ∈ R1×n≥0 be the
outside liability vector, where the entry ei denotes the amount of liabilities of node
i towards entities outside the network. These liabilities are assumed to have equal
priority to the interbank liabilities.
The total liability vector is denoted by ` ∈ R1×n≥0 , with `i :=
∑n
j=1 li,j + ei being
the total amount of obligations from node i to all other nodes and to the outside





if `i > 0
0 if `i = 0,
the relative size of liabilities owed by i to j. Here, Π is the interbank relative liability
matrix. Because i may also owe to entities outside the network,
∑n
j=1 pii,j ≤ 1 for
each i, i.e. Π is row substochastic.
The approach used by [Glasserman and Young(2015)] to model bankruptcy costs
captures the fact that large shortfalls are more costly than small shortfalls. Con-












Above, the term in curly brackets is the shortfall of node i at default. Multiplying this
quantity by the factor γ gives the bankruptcy costs incurred by node i at default.
After accounting for these deadweight losses, the assets of node i are distributed
proportionally to its creditors. Hence, the clearing payment vector p∗ ∈ R1×n≥0 is a
solution to the system
p∗ =
(
[` ∧ (p∗Π + c)]− γ [`− (p∗Π + c)]+)+ ,
where for any two vectors x, y ∈ Rn,
x ∧ y :=
(




and x+ := (max{x1, 0},max{x2, 0}, . . . ,max{xn, 0}) . Using the equality (x − y)+ =
x− (x ∧ y), the above equation may be re-written as
p∗ =
(
(1 + γ) [` ∧ (p∗Π + c)]− γ`
)+
= ` ∧ [p∗(1 + γ)Π + (1 + γ)c− γ`]+ .
From the above expression, it is obvious that if γ = 0, then p∗ coincides with the
clearing payment vector in the basic Eisenberg-Noe model.
We use the 4-tuple (Π, `, c, γ) to identify the financial system. We make the
following assumption, supported by empirical evidence provided in section 2.5.
Assumption 2.2.1. For any financial system (Π, `, c, γ), (1 + γ)c− γ` ≥ 0.
[Glasserman and Young(2015)] mention that the case to be expected in practice
is γ < 0.5. When γ = 0.5, the above condition reduces to c ≥ `/3. We conduct
an empirical study in Section 2.5 showing that, in this case, the previous inequality
always holds (see Table 2.2 for details). Then the fixed point equation yielding the
clearing payments can be simplified to
p∗ = ` ∧ [p∗(1 + γ)Π + (1 + γ)c− γ`] .
[Glasserman and Young(2015)] show that the clearing payment vector is uniquely
determined if the spectral radius of the matrix (1 + γ)Π is smaller than 1. This
turns out to be the case in most financial networks. (For instance, [Glasserman and
Young(2015)] use European Banking Authority’s 2011 stress test data and find that
the fraction of liabilities within the interbank network is 0.43.)
In the sequel, we use p∗(Π, `, c, γ) to emphasize the dependence of the clearing
payment vector on the financial system (Π, `, c, γ). We also distinguish between the
asset value of a node before clearing and after clearing. The vector of asset values
before clearing consists of the values of assets held by each node if all liabilities are
repaid in full, and no bankruptcy costs are incurred. This is given by `Π + c. The
vector of asset values after clearing has components given by the values of assets
held by each node after interbank clearing occurred. This is given by (p∗Π + c) −
γ [`− (p∗Π + c)]+.
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2.2.3 Objective of this Study
We aim at understanding how losses are affected by concentration of liabilities.
The loss vector associated with the financial system (Π, `, c, γ) is defined as the dif-
ference between the total liability and clearing payment vector, i.e.
s(Π, `, c, γ) := `− p∗(Π, `, c, γ).
The i-th component of the above vector denotes the amount of losses generated by
node i. We illustrate in Figure 2.1 the behavior which we aim at capturing. The top
graphs give interbank networks where the node with the largest outstanding liabilities
(node 4) has the smallest equity value. The bottom graphs give interbank networks
where the node with the smallest outstanding amount of liabilities (node 1) has the
smallest equity value. Both top and bottom panels have in common that the node
with the smallest equity value generates the largest loss in the system. Then the
network with the smallest net exposure to this node is always the most preferred
in terms of losses. However, there is a distinguishing feature between the interbank
network structures. In the top panels, the undesired system is the network whose
liabilities are less concentrated. In the bottom panels, instead, the network with
higher concentration of liabilities is the undesired one. Our objective is to capture
this behavior quantitatively.
The next section defines balancing systems to capture the network behavior re-
ported in the top panels of Figure 2.1, and unbalancing systems to capture the network
behavior in the bottom panels.
2.3 Concentration of Liabilities
The objective of this section is to quantitatively analyze how concentration of
liabilities affects the loss profile of a financial system. Preliminaries on majorization,
along with related results that will be extensively used later, are summarized in
Section 2.3.1. A relaxed equivalent version of the relative liability matrix is introduced
15
(a) Networks in which the node with the largest outstanding liabilities (node 4) has the
smallest equity value. Higher liability concentration generates smaller loss, hence it is
preferred.
(b) Networks in which the node with the smallest outstanding liabilities (node 1) has
the smallest equity value. Lower liability concentration generates smaller loss, hence is
preferred.
Figure 2.1. Networks illustrating the objective of study. We set γ =
0. † The equity under the base-liability configuration is given by
`Π + c − `. ‡ The equity under the reduced-liability configuration is
given by `Π + c− `, where ` is later defined in Eq. (2.3).
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in Section 2.3.2, and this proves to be the key to characterizing liability concentration
via matrix majorization. The notions of balancing and unbalancing systems and
results concerning loss preferences are presented in Section 2.3.3.
2.3.1 Preliminary Results
We start recalling the definition of similarly ordered vectors. Two vectors x and y
are similarly ordered if (xi−xj)(yi− yj) ≥ 0 for all i, j (see also [Arnold et al.(2011)]
Ch.6 Proposition A.1.a).
Next, we define what it means for a matrix to be order preserving.
Definition 2.3.1. Let D ∈ Rn×n and A ⊂ Rn be a subset of the space of n dimen-
sional real-valued vectors. D is order preserving w.r.t A if for x ∈ A, xD and x are
similarly ordered.
The next lemma characterizes the set of matrices which are order preserving w.r.t.
a set of nonnegative similarly ordered vectors. Let A be a set of nonnegative similarly
ordered vectors and x be an arbitrary element of A. We denote by ν(A) the mapping




Lemma 2.3.1. Fix a vector z ∈ Rn>0 and let A := {x|x is similarly ordered to z,0 ≤










i,j+1 , k = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , n− 1 .
Next, we define the class of matrices which preserves the weak majorization order.
Definition 2.3.2. Let D ∈ Rn×n and A ⊂ Rn be a subset of the space of n dimen-
sional real-valued vectors.
• D is weak submajorization preserving w.r.t A if for x, y ∈ A,
x ≺w y implies xD ≺w yD.
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• D is weak supermajorization preserving w.r.t A if for x, y ∈ A,
x ≺w y implies xD ≺w yD.
The set of order preserving matrices which are also weak submajorization or weak
supermajorization preserving are characterized in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.3.2. Fix a vector z ∈ Rn>0 and let A := {x|x is similarly ordered to z,0 ≤
x ≤ z}. Assume that D ∈ Rn×n is an order preserving matrix w.r.t. A. The following
statements hold:










i+1,j , k = 1, . . . , n, i = 1, . . . , n− 1 .










i+1,j , k = 1, . . . , n, i = 1, . . . , n− 1 .
2.3.2 Liability Matrix: Relaxation and Concentration
The presence of zero elements on the diagonal of the matrix Π (i.e. pii,i = 0)
restricts drastically the set of matrices Π that are order preserving. Indeed, multi-
plying a vector x by a relative liability matrix Π, we can obtain a vector xΠ that
has the opposite ordering of x. Such a situation can be avoided by replacing Π with
a suitably chosen relaxed version defined as follows.
Definition 2.3.3. A 3-tuple (Πα,γ, `, cα,γ), α ∈ [0, 1), is called the α-relaxed equiva-
lent version of a financial system (Π, `, c, γ), if Πα,γ = (1 − α) [(1 + γ)Π] + αI and
cα,γ = (1− α) [(1 + γ)c− γ`]. Here I is the identity matrix.
As an example, consider the case of no bankruptcy costs. Choosing α = 0.5, we
















































The clearing payment vector is invariant with respect to this relaxation, as stated
in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.3.3. Let (Π, `, c, γ) be a financial system. Then it holds that p∗(Π, `, c, γ) =
p∗(Πα,γ, `, cα,γ) for any α ∈ [0, 1).
Last, in order to compare two network topologies with different liability config-
urations, the notion of majorization for vectors is generalized to majorization for
matrices.
Definition 2.3.4. Let X and Y be m×n matrices. X is said to be majorized by Y,
X ≺ Y, if there exists a doubly stochastic matrix S such that X = YS.
If X ≺ Y, each row in X is more evenly distributed than the corresponding row
in Y. Indeed, when m = 1, it is well known that this definition is equivalent to
Definition 2.2.1 (see [Arnold et al.(2011)] Ch.2 Theorem B.2). This leads us to use
the following criteria to compare networks in terms of liability concentration.
Definition 2.3.5. Given two financial systems (Πa, `, c, γ) and (Πb, `, c, γ), we say
that b has a higher liability concentration than a if there exists α ∈ [0, 1) such that
Πaα,γ ≺ Πbα,γ.
The above definition is consistent with intuition. All systems whose relative lia-
bility matrices are permutations of each other have the same liability concentration.
In all other cases, if b has higher liability concentration than a, then a cannot have
higher concentration than b. The precise statement and proof of this fact is given in
Lemma A.1 in the appendix.
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Using the above definition of liability concentration, we can verify that the net-
works in the left panels of Figure 2.1, here denoted by a, have lower liability concen-
trations than those in the right panels, here denoted by b. For the top panels, we
have that Πa0.2,0 ≺ Πb0.2,0, given that

0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2






0.2 0 0 0.6
0 0.2 0 0.6
0 0 0.2 0.6





0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25





For the bottom panels, we have that Πa0.14,0 ≺ Πb0.14,0, i.e.,
0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14






0.14 0.42 0 0
0 0.14 0 0.42
0 0 0.14 0.42





0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25





Remark 2.3.1. [Amini et al.(2010)] use the proportion of edges which are contagious
to assess the resilience of a financial network to shocks. The weight of the edge directed
from i to j represents the exposure of i to j. The edge from i to j is contagious if
node j’s default will cause i to default. Fix a level of total exposure within the network
(given by the sum of bilateral exposures). In their model, losses are proportional to
the size of exposures. Hence, a larger fraction of contagious edges implies a higher
concentration of exposures within the network, and in turn a larger default cascade.
Conversely, a smaller fraction of contagious edges implies a lower concentration of
exposures and a smaller default cascade. Asymptotically, their analysis shows that
a financial network with fewer contagious links is more resilient to shocks. Using
the above mentioned implications, their results also indicate that a financial network
with lower concentration of exposures is more resilient to shocks. Their results are
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consistent with ours for the case of unbalancing systems, where higher systemic losses
arise in the network with higher concentration of liabilities (see Theorem 2.3.2 for
details).
2.3.3 Loss Preferences in Balancing and Unbalancing Systems
This section defines the class of balancing and unbalancing financial systems and
provides quantitative statements relating liability concentration to loss profiles. We
make the following empirically supported assumption (see Section 2.5, Table 2.2, for
details).
Assumption 2.3.1. For any financial system (Π, `, c, γ), ` and [(1 + γ)c− γ`] are
similarly ordered.
This assumption directly implies that ` and c are similarly ordered, i.e. that nodes
with larger liabilities also have larger outside asset values.
The definition of balancing and unbalancing systems depends on the nodes’ equity
under the base and reduced-liability configurations. In the balancing system, the
equity of node i is




The above can be viewed as the pre-clearing equity at node i (or equivalently, its
post-clearing equity assuming all nodes pay their full liabilities). In the unbalancing
system, the equity is computed by reducing each node’s liability to a level as follows:
` := `− δ1, where δ := max
{
`(1) − [(1 + γ)c− γ`](1) , 0
}
(2.3)
and 1 denotes a row vector with all entries equal to one. Thus, the equity of node i
is given by





We show in the following Lemma 2.3.4 that ` coincides with the maximum liability
vector under which all nodes can repay their liabilities in full.
Given a financial system (Π, `, c, γ), we set µ := ν({`}), so that µi = j if `(i) = `j.
We define balancing and unbalancing financial systems and illustrate their structural
properties in Figure 2.2.
Definition 2.3.6. Let (Π, `, c, γ) be a financial system.















− `(j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
equity of node (j + 1) ≤ equity of node (j) under the base-liability configuration
. (2.4)















− `(j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
equity of node (j + 1) ≥ equity of node (j) under the reduced-liability configuration
, (2.5)
where we recall that ` is defined in Eq. (2.3).
Intuitively, in a balancing system, a node with a larger liability (`(j+1)) has a
smaller equity before clearing, as represented by the inequality in (2.4); in an unbal-
ancing system, if a node has a larger liability then it also has a larger equity before
clearing under the reduced-liability configuration, per the inequality in (2.5). This
captures precisely the behavior of the networks illustrated in Figure 2.1, where the
node with the largest liability has the smallest equity value in the top two graphs
(balancing system), while the same node has the largest equity value in the bottom
two graphs (unbalancing system).
The next lemma shows that under the reduced-liability configuration, all nodes
repay their liabilities in full; and the reduction as specified in (2.3) is minimal —
short of which the absence of default is no longer guaranteed.
Lemma 2.3.4. For any unbalancing system (Π, `, c, γ), it must hold that p∗(Π, `, c, γ) =
`. For any vector  with strictly positive entries, there exists at least one unbalancing
system (Π, `, c, γ) such that p∗(Π, `+ , c, γ) 6≥ `+.
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Figure 2.2. Balancing: if a node has larger liabilities than another,
then its equity is smaller under the base-liability configuration. Un-
balancing: if a node has larger liabilities than another, then its equity
is larger under the reduced-liability configuration.
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To proceed further, we need to first specify the set of payment vectors used to
analyze the loss generated in balancing and unbalancing systems:
P = {p | p is similarly ordered to `,0 ≤ p ≤ `} .
Note that in characterizing P , the condition of p being similarly ordered to ` is
the more substantive one. It requires that the nodes making larger payments are
also those with larger outstanding liabilities; and Proposition 2.3.1 gives a sufficient
condition for this to hold. The other condition 0 ≤ p ≤ ` says that a node does not
pay more than its nominal liabilities, but allows for a large class of payment vectors
including those for which absolute priority or limited liability is violated.
The following proposition characterizes the relations between clearing payments,
liabilities and loss vectors, both in balancing and unbalancing financial systems.
Proposition 2.3.1. Let (Π, `, c, γ) be a financial system. Suppose there exists α ∈
[0, 1) such that Πα,γ is order preserving w.r.t. to P. Then,
(I) p∗ is similarly ordered to `.
(II) If (Π, `, c, γ) is balancing, then `[1] − p∗[1] ≥ `[2] − p∗[2] ≥ · · · ≥ `[n] − p∗[n].
(III) If (Π, `, c, γ) is unbalancing, then `(1) − p∗(1) ≥ `(2) − p∗(2) ≥ · · · ≥ `(n) − p∗(n).
The above proposition indicates that when there exists an α-relaxed equivalent
version that preserves the order of payments, the nodes making larger payments are
also those with larger liabilities. Moreover, larger shortfalls occur at nodes with larger
liabilities in balancing systems, and at those with smaller liabilities in unbalancing
systems.
The next theorem compares clearing payment vectors and loss profiles in balancing
systems based on liability concentration. It concludes that the system with a higher
concentration is preferred as it results in a smaller loss.
Theorem 2.3.1. Let (Πa, `, c, γ) and (Πb, `, c, γ) be two balancing financial systems.
Suppose there exists α ∈ [0, 1) such that both Πaα,γ and Πbα,γ are order preserving
w.r.t. P and
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(I) Πaα,γ or Π
b
α,γ is weak submajorization preserving w.r.t. P ,
(II) Πaα,γ ≺ Πbα,γ.
Then, p∗(Πa, `, c, γ) ≺w p∗(Πb, `, c, γ) and s(Πa, `, c, γ) w s(Πb, `, c, γ).
Here is the intuition behind the above results. First, from the earlier Proposi-
tion 2.3.1, we know that in the balancing case larger shortfalls occur at nodes with
larger liabilities; and this holds for both systems a and b. Moreover, in one of the
systems, those nodes with larger liabilities will make larger payments due to the weak
submajorization preserving condition in (I) (this can be seen from Lemma 2.3.2 set-
ting D = Πaα,γ), and they will receive smaller payments in system a than in system
b, as the payments in system a are more evenly distributed due to the majorization
order in (II). Consequently, nodes with large liabilities in system a will make less
payments and have larger shortfalls relative to those in system b.
Next, we give the corresponding result for unbalancing systems. In this case, the
system with a lower liability concentration is preferred.
Theorem 2.3.2. Let (Πa, `, c, γ), (Πb, `, c, γ) be two unbalancing financial systems.
Suppose there exists α ∈ [0, 1) such that both Πaα,γ and Πbα,γ are order preserving
w.r.t. P and
(I) Πaα,γ or Π
b
α,γ is weak supermajorization preserving w.r.t. P,
(II) Πaα,γ ≺ Πbα,γ.
Then, p∗(Πa, `, c, γ) ≺w p∗(Πb, `, c, γ) and s(Πa, `, c, γ) ≺w s(Πb, `, c, γ).
Here the intuition parallels the balancing case. In the unbalancing case larger
shortfalls occur at nodes with smaller liabilities, per Proposition 2.3.1; and the losses
are exacerbated by the fact that those nodes tend to make larger payments, due
to the weak supermajorization preserving condition in (I) (this can be seen from
Lemma 2.3.2 setting D = Πbα,γ). Moreover, those same nodes in system b will
receive smaller payments than in system a, due to the majorization order in (II).
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Figure 2.3. Two financial systems consisting of six nodes whose
liabilities are `6 > `5 > · · · > `1. For brevity, p∗(Πa, `, c, γ)
and p∗(Πb, `, c, γ) are denoted, respectively, by pa∗ and pb∗. The
graphs illustrate the relation between asset values of defaulted nodes
after clearing (when a node i defaults, it must hold that p∗i =[
(p∗Π + c)− γ [`− (p∗Π + c)]+]
i
= [p∗Πα,γ + cα,γ]i) and liability
concentration. The left panel illustrates that in balancing systems,
losses occur at the nodes with larger liabilities and larger losses are
generated in system a where liabilities are less concentrated. The
right panel illustrates that in unbalancing systems, losses occur at
the nodes with smaller liabilities and larger losses occur in system b
where liabilities are more concentrated.
Consequently, nodes with smaller liabilities in system b can only make less payments
and have larger shortfalls relative to those in system a.
Figure 2.3 illustrates how liability concentration affects the asset values of nodes
after clearing, and consequently the loss profile in both types of systems.
We conclude this section with a result indicating that systemic losses would be
reduced if the financial system is both balancing and unbalancing. As the next lemma
shows, if at least one node does not default and order preserving relations of the
relative liability matrix are maintained, there would be zero loss in such a financial
system. From a regulatory perspective, this suggests that it is beneficial to drive the
network towards such a state.
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i,j ≥ 0 for j = 1, . . . , n − 1, and at least one node repays its liabilities in full.
If (Π, `, c, γ) is both balancing and unbalancing, then s(Π, `, c, γ) = 0.
We next provide an example showing the existence of a system satisfying the
conditions in the above proposition.
Example 2.3.1. Consider a balancing (respectively unbalancing) system (Π, `, c, γ)
where the column sums of Π are identical and the inequalities in (2.4) (respec-
tively (2.5)) become equalities. Then the system is both balancing and unbalancing.
One instance of such a system is given by
Π =

0 0.27 0.27 0.24
0.26 0 0.25 0.28
0.26 0.25 0 0.28
0.28 0.28 0.28 0
 , ` =
(




1 3.6 6.1 59.8
)
, γ = 0 .
Clearly, the difference between two consecutive rank ordered components in `Π +
c =
(
18.7 20.7 22.7 64.7
)
and ` are the same. The same applies to `Π + c =(




1 3 5 47
)
.
2.4 Application to Core-Periphery Network
This section develops numerical examples of financial networks which mimic the
structure of tiered systems. Such systems have been identified by empirical research as
good descriptors of interbank activity, see the study of [Craig and Von Peter(2014)]
on the German banking system from 1999 to 2007, and of [Fricke and Lux(2015)]
on the overnight interbank transactions in the Italian market from 1999 to 2010.
Our objective is to apply the results developed in the previous sections to analyze
which tiered structure is preferred depending on whether the system is balancing or
unbalancing.
In a tiered financial system the pattern of interbank liabilities follows a core-
periphery structure. The network is centered around a set of core nodes which in-
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termediate between numerous smaller nodes in the periphery. In particular, such a
network has following properties:
(I) The size of the core node is significantly larger than that of peripheral nodes.
[Craig and Von Peter(2014)] find that the average size of core banks is 51 times
that of peripheral banks.
(II) The peripheral nodes do not borrow from or lend to other peripheral nodes.
A financial system satisfying (I) and (II) is called perfectly tiered, while a financial
system which only satisfies (I) is called imperfectly tiered. For illustration purposes,
we set the number of nodes n = 4, with nodes 1, 2, 3 being peripheral and node
4 core. This means that the relative liability matrix Πa of an imperfectly tiered
























where piai,j ≥ 0 for i, j = 1, . . . , 3, and at least one entry piai,j > 0. The relative liability
matrix Πb of a perfectly tiered financial system, instead, has the form given by
Πb =

0 0 0 pib1,4
0 0 0 pib2,4







where pibi,4 ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . , 3, and pib4,j ≥ 0 for j = 1, . . . , 3.
We next develop numerical examples of networks that are balancing or unbalanc-








0 0.25 0.25 0.24
0.23 0 0.23 0.28
0.23 0.23 0 0.28




0 0.24 0.25 0.25
0.18 0 0.28 0.28
0.18 0.28 0 0.28




0 0 0 0.74
0 0 0 0.74
0 0 0 0.74








3g, 4g, 5g, 25g
)
, and γ = 1/5. Here, g is a
positive constant. Choosing α = 1/4, we obtain
Πa1/4,1/5 =

0.25 0.23 0.23 0.21
0.21 0.25 0.21 0.25
0.21 0.21 0.25 0.25





0.25 0.21 0.23 0.23
0.17 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.17 0.25 0.25 0.25




0.25 0 0 0.67
0 0.25 0 0.67
0 0 0.25 0.67
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
 ,
where the relaxed versions Πa1/4,1/5 and Π˜
a
1/4,1/5 are both order and weak submajoriza-
tion preserving w.r.t. P . This is because both systems satisfy the assumptions in
lemmas 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. Moreover, Πb1/4,1/5 is order preserving w.r.t. P given that
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0.35 0.27 0.27 0.11
0.2 0.31 0.17 0.32
0.2 0.17 0.31 0.32
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
 , S˜ =

0.47 0.11 0.21 0.21
0.17 0.31 0.26 0.26
0.17 0.31 0.26 0.26
0.19 0.27 0.27 0.27








We next show that (Πa, `, c, γ), (Π˜a, `, c, γ) and (Πb, `, c, γ) are balancing. For
these systems, the equity vectors under the base-liability configuration are given by
`Πa + c− ` = (16g, 15g, 13g,−20g)
`Π˜a + c− ` = (16g, 15g, 14g,−20g)
`Πb + c− ` = (13g, 12g, 11g,−12g).
These vectors are all reversely ordered to the liability vector `, which implies that the
three systems are balancing from Definition 2.3.6.
By taking convex combinations of the financial systems (Πa, `, c, γ) and (Π˜a, `, c, γ),
we can generate a large class of balancing systems. Concretely, let (Πˆa, `, c, γ) =
λ(Πa, `, c, γ)+(1−λ)(Π˜a, `, c, γ) for some λ ∈ [0, 1]. Then it is clear that (Πˆa, `, c, γ)
is balancing because the class of balancing systems is closed under convex combina-
tion. Moreover, Πˆa1/4,1/5 is order and weak submajorization preserving w.r.t. P since
both of these relations are preserved for convex combinations. Additionally Πˆa1/4,1/5




1/4,1/5S + (1 − λ)Πb1/4,1/5S˜, and
λS + (1− λ)S˜ is doubly stochastic.
Since both (Πˆa, `, c, γ) and (Πb, `, c, γ) satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 2.3.1,
we deduce that s(Πˆa, `, c, γ) w s(Πb, `, c, γ). Therefore, the perfectly tiered network
is preferred to the imperfectly tiered network if both are balancing.
This can be understood as follows. When a network is balancing, nodes with
larger liabilities will incur larger losses, i.e. the core nodes, see also left panel of
Figure 2.3. Moreover, from Theorem 2.3.1 we obtain that the clearing payments in
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the imperfectly tiered network are more evenly distributed than the corresponding
payments in the perfectly tiered network. This is because in the imperfectly tiered
structure, larger payments are made to periphery as opposed to core nodes, while in
the perfectly tiered structure all payments from peripheral nodes are directed to core
nodes. Hence, core nodes are more likely to default and generate larger losses in the
imperfectly tiered network.
2.4.2 Unbalancing Networks




0 0.32 0.33 0.25
0.27 0 0.33 0.3
0.27 0.25 0 0.38




0 0.33 0.32 0.25
0.25 0 0.32 0.33
0.25 0.31 0 0.34




0 0 0 0.9
0 0 0 0.9
0 0 0 0.9








3g, 8g, 13g, 56g
)
, and γ = 1/10. Choosing
α = 1/4, we obtain
Πa1/4,1/10 =

0.25 0.26 0.27 0.21
0.22 0.25 0.27 0.25
0.22 0.21 0.25 0.31





0.25 0.27 0.26 0.21
0.21 0.25 0.26 0.27
0.21 0.25 0.25 0.28




0.25 0 0 0.74
0 0.25 0 0.74
0 0 0.25 0.74
0.15 0.25 0.25 0.25
 .
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The relaxed versions Πa1/4,1/10 and Π˜
a
1/4,1/10 are both order and weak supermajoriza-
tion preserving w.r.t. P because they satisfy the assumptions of lemmas 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.
Moreover, Πb1/4,1/10 is order preserving w.r.t. P because it satisfies the conditions in
Lemma 2.3.1. The doubly stochastic matrices
S =

0.34 0.33 0.33 0
0.22 0.29 0.23 0.26
0.22 0.15 0.15 0.48
0.22 0.23 0.29 0.26
 , S˜ =

0.37 0.33 0.3 0
0.21 0.2 0.23 0.36
0.21 0.2 0.2 0.39
0.21 0.27 0.27 0.25








We next verify that (Πa, `, c, γ), (Π˜a, `, c, γ) and (Πb, `, c, γ) are unbalancing.
The equity vectors under the reduced-liability configuration are given by
`Πa + c− ` = (14g, 16g, 19g, 22g)
`Π˜a + c− ` = (13g, 17g, 19g, 22g)
`Πb + c− ` = (9g, 16g, 19g, 27g),
and are all similarly ordered to the liability vector `. This implies that all three
systems are unbalancing.
Consider a convex combination of the two imperfectly tiered systems, given by
(Πˆa, `, c, γ) = λ(Πa, `, c, γ) + (1 − λ)(Π˜a, `, c, γ), where λ ∈ [0, 1]. Since the class of
unbalancing systems is closed under convex combinations, we have that (Πˆa, `, c, γ)
is also unbalancing, while Πˆa1/4,1/10 is order and weak supermajorization preserving
w.r.t. P and majorized by Πb1/4,1/10. The majorization relation follows from the fact
that Πˆa1/4,1/10 = λΠ
b
1/4,1/10S + (1− λ)Πb1/4,1/10S˜.
Since both (Πˆa, `, c, γ) and (Πb, `, c, γ) satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 2.3.2,
we deduce that s(Πˆa, `, c, γ) ≺w s(Πb, `, c, γ). Hence, if both networks are unbalanc-
ing, the imperfectly tiered is preferred to the perfectly tiered network. This can be
explained in intuitive terms as follows. When a network is unbalancing, larger losses
are incurred by nodes with smaller liabilities, i.e peripheral nodes, see also right panel
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of Figure 2.3. From Theorem 2.3.2, we obtain that the clearing payments in the per-
fectly tiered network are less evenly distributed than the corresponding payments in
the imperfectly tiered network. This is because in the latter, larger payments are
directed to periphery as opposed to core nodes, while in the perfectly tiered network
peripheral nodes only receive payments from the core node. Hence, they are more
likely to default and generate larger losses.
2.5 Empirical Analysis and Policy Implications
The objective of this section is to provide empirical evidence to (1) support the
two assumptions made earlier in this chapter and (2) show that real-world financial
networks often tend to be in an unbalancing state. We consider the system consisting
of the banking sectors in eight European countries for seven years, starting from 2008
and ending in 2014. These countries are well representative of interbank activities in
the European market as their liabilities account for 80% of the total liabilities of the
European banking sector.
We use consolidated banking data released from the European Central Bank,
reported in Table 2.2, and foreign claims data from the BIS (Bank for International
Settlements) Quarterly Review, summarized in Table 2.1, to estimate the various
parameters of the financial system.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show that both assumptions are satisfied in December 2009
and June 2010. Assumption 2.2.1 holds because the values in the fourth column of
Table 2.2 are all positive. Moreover, such column is similarly ordered to the second
column, hence showing that Assumption 2.3.1 also holds. Table 2.2 indicates that the
financial system is in the unbalancing state at these two time points. This is because
the column corresponding to the equity under the reduced-liability configuration is
similarly ordered to the total liability vector in the second column.
We next analyze if the unbalancing state of the system is persistent over time. To
this purpose, we recall that a financial system is unbalancing if all the inequalities
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given in (2.5) are satisfied. Table 2.3 computes the degree of unbalance of the system,
estimated as the ratio between the number of satisfied inequalities over the total
number of inequalities. Large values of this ratio are indicative of a financial system
which is close to an unbalancing state. The results in Table 2.3 confirm the findings
from Tables 2.1 and 2.2 that the system is unbalancing in December 2009 and June
2010, and additionally indicate it is close to being unbalancing at the remaining points
in time.
Since higher concentration of liabilities induce larger systemic losses in unbal-
ancing systems, the theoretical findings of our study indicate that it is desirable for
regulatory purposes to reduce gross exposures to individual counterparties and drive
the network towards a state of smaller concentration. Policies of this type are al-
ready in place, see for instance the supervisory framework put forward by the Basel
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                     
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Table 2.2.
Consolidated banking sector data of European countries. Data source:
European Central Bank. The first two columns report the values of
assets and liabilities of each banking sector. In our model, these
correspond respectively to `Π + c and `. We set γ = 0.5. The values
reported in the third and fourth columns are computed as follows.
We first estimate the relative liability matrix, Π, whose entries are
obtained from the interbank liability matrix in Table 2.1 and the
vector ` of total liabilities. We then compute c by subtracting `Π
from the asset value vector given in the first column. The equity
under the reduced-liability configuration is estimated using Eq. (2.5).
December 2009 (in USD billion)
Country Assets Liabilities Equity† (1 + γ)c− γ`
UK 13,833 13,204 674 12,849
Germany 12,366 11,901 504 10,557
France 9,053 8,616 472 7,155
Spain 5,350 5,024 374 4,545
Netherlands 3,795 3,632 213 2,747
Ireland 1,919 1,828 149 1,446
Belgium 1,706 1,629 133 1,427
Portugal 732 686 104 627
June 2010 (in USD billion)
Country Assets Liabilities Equity† (1 + γ)c− γ`
UK 13,956 13,258 736 12,982
Germany 11,533 11,126 443 9,936
France 8,485 8,077 439 6,864
Spain 4,765 4,482 325 4,052
Netherlands 3,506 3,366 184 2,715
Ireland 1,758 1,678 129 1,337
Belgium 1,530 1,464 116 1,276
Portugal 654 615 90 563
†The equity under the reduced-liability configuration.
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Table 2.3.
The degree of unbalance of the financial system consisting of the eight
representative banking sectors at ten different time points. In each
time point, we sort the eight banking sectors by increasing liability
size. We then check if the inequalities in Eq. (2.5) are satisfied for
each pair of adjacent banking sectors. This yields a total of seven
inequalities. We compute the degree of unbalance as the number of













CHAPTER 3. SYSTEMIC RISK MITIGATION IN FINANCIAL
NETWORKS
3.1 Introduction
The prevailing literature on systemic risk have analyzed the consequences caused
by defaults using a static model of counterparty exposures. Although static mod-
els provide insights about immediate consequences caused by defaults, they do not
capture the propagation and aftershocks of default events. We advance the above
literature by developing a multi-period clearing system, where the level of systemic
risk can be controlled through provision of liquidity assistance loans. Such loans are
provided by a regulatory entity, hereon referred to as the lender of last resort (LOLR),
who has complete information on the liability structure of the network and mitigates
systemic risk by providing liquidity loans to illiquid, but solvent banks. 1 Such liquid-
ity assistance policies are supported by the classical doctrine of the LOLR elaborated
by [Bagehot(1873)], and theoretically justified by [Rochet and Vives(2004)].
We consider a stochastically evolving interbank liability structure where clearing,
or settlement, of interbank claims is done using a dynamic extension of the algorithm
originally proposed by [Eisenberg and Noe(2001)]. We show that if the subgraph of
the financial network induced by the surviving banks is regular at all times, then the
time sequence of clearing payments is unique when a liquidity loan allocation strategy
is specified. The time evolving nature of the network allows modeling the dynamic
component of systemic risk. [Merton et al.(2013)] also analyze macro risk changes
occurring over time and find that interbank exposures are very sensitive to changes
1If complete information of the financial network is not readily available, the regulator may also
construct accurate proxies for interbank liabilities using standard methodologies, see for instance
[Docherty and Wang(2010)]. Such procedures use transaction data from the U.S. Federal Fund
Markets as proxies for decomposing the observed total liabilities into interbank liabilities.
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in values of the underlying assets. The time related perspective of systemic risk is
also emphasized in [ECB(2009)], see page 127 therein.
Our network model is designed to analyze systemic risk in networks of insured
commercial banks. The latter are supervised by the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration (FDIC), which usually uses the Purchase and Assumption (P&A) transac-
tion to sell non-cash assets of defaulted banks in the network. Following [Giliberto
and Varaiya(1989)], we assume that the sale is done through a first-price sealed-bid
auction using the common value model. We assess systemic risk mitigation on the
core-periphery network model. [Craig and Von Peter(2014)] performed an empirical
analysis using bilateral interbank data from German banks from 1999 to 2007 and
found that the matrix of interbank liabilities follows a tiered core-periphery structure.
Such findings are also confirmed by [Fricke and Lux(2015)] who employed a detailed
dataset containing all overnight interbank transactions in the Italian market from
1999 to 2010, and found that a core-periphery structure provides the best fit for these
interbank data, with high degree of persistence over time.
We analyze the performance of two liquidity assistance strategies. The first, called
Systemic Importance Driven and abbreviated with SID, provides liquidity assistance
loans to systemically important banks. The second policy, called Max-Liquidity and
abbreviated with ML, maximizes the instantaneous total liquidity in the network.
We find that policies rescuing systemically important banks are preferred to those
maximizing the total liquidity in the system when the network has a core-periphery
structure. The reason is that, under the ML policy, there is a higher probability for
systemically important banks to default. Failures of core banks use up the cash of
solvent banks which need to purchase them through the auction, and hence become
less liquid. This in turn increases the likelihood of defaults occurring in later periods
and results in large increases of systemic risk in the network. When the variation
in interbank liabilities is higher, a larger systemic risk reduction is obtained by SID
relative to ML policy, given that the systemic consequences when systemically im-
portant banks fail are stronger. We find that systemic risk levels tend to maintain
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similar levels over time when the SID policy is employed, while they manifest higher
fluctuations in time under the ML strategy given the network is subject to a latency
before stabilizing after early failures of systemically important banks. We also provide
comparisons with a baseline random network and find that the ML policy is slightly
preferred in this case. This is because all banks are equally systemically important
and hence reducing systemic risk by maximizing the total liquidity in the system is
preferable to targeting a specific set of banks to which provide liquidity assistance if
the need arises.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the building
blocks of our framework and develops the controlled multi-period clearing payment
system. Section 3.3 introduces the mitigation strategies. Section 3.4 discusses sys-
temic risk under the core-periphery and random network topology.
3.2 The Framework
3.2.1 Financial Network
We fix a finite time horizon T divided into discrete intervals [t, t+1), t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T−
1}, corresponding to times when interbank payments occur. We consider a network
consisting of n nodes representing financial institutions which are insured commercial
banks.
The state of the financial network is characterized by a time sequence of 2-tuples,
(Lt, ct). Here, Lt ∈ Rn×n≥0 is the interbank liability matrix at t, with lti,j denoting the
amount of liabilities owed by i to j at t for i 6= j, and lti,i = 0. We use ct ∈ Rn≥0 to
denote the operating cash inflow vector, i.e. cti quantifies the proceeds generated from
operating activities of bank i at t. We will later specify how Lt and ct are formed,
taking into account acquisitions arising in the network when banks default.
40




i,j being the total






if `ti > 0
0 if `ti = 0
the relative size of liabilities owed by i to j at t. Here, Πt is the associated liability
proportion matrix.
In our model each bank can neither sell illiquid assets nor borrow from the private
sector. Such assumptions are mild, if we consider that our model is designed to
understand systemic implications in crisis periods, as opposed to normal times.
The network is stochastic and the randomness comes from the uncertain nature
of interbank liabilities and operating cash inflows before any acquisition takes place.
We denote them by L˜t and c˜t respectively, to distinguish from the corresponding
quantities Lt and ct corresponding to the after acquisition stage. Both l˜ti,j and c˜
t
i are
considered to be discrete time stochastic processes.
3.2.2 Lender of Last Resort (LOLR)
We introduce an outside entity, who has complete information on state of the
network, and whose goal is to provide liquidity assistance loans to illiquid yet solvent
banks according to a specified policy.
A bank is said to be rescued if it receives a loan from the LOLR. We denote
by oti ≥ 0 the liquidity assistance loan granted by the LOLR to bank i at t; ot is
the associated vector. We distinguish the interbank interest rate r from the rate
rc at which liquidity loans need to be repaid.
2 Liquidity loans are assumed to be
longer-term than the time horizon, i.e. they are returned after T .
2All loans granted from the Fed under the emergency program were repaid with an interest rate
ranging between 0.5% to 3.5%, which was different from the prevailing market rate.
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3.2.3 Illiquidity and Insolvency
We denote by pti the total payment made by bank i at time t. We use v
t
i ≥ 0 to
denote the available cash before clearing to i at t. We then have that the available










i − `ti. (3.1)
A bank i is defined to be illiquid at time t if κti < 0. Next, we introduce two other
quantities of interest, ξti representing the total amount of non-cash assets belonging
to bank i, and qti indicating the net assets of bank i. The first quantity is given by
the present value of operating cash inflows of i and book value of liabilities owed by
other banks in the network to i in subsequent periods, while the second quantity is




























Here, for a given random variable X we denote by Et[X] the expectation of X
conditioned on the information set available at time t under the actual measure. In
addition, the adjustment for the obligor’s credit risk is not included in the value of
non-cash assets, i.e. we deal with accounting-based valuation. The information set is
generated by the sample path of interbank liabilities and operating cash inflows up
to time t. A bank i is said to be insolvent at time t if qti < 0.
3.2.4 Default
Definition 3.2.1. A bank is said to default at time t if it is (1) illiquid and insolvent
at t or (2) illiquid and solvent at t but not rescued by the LOLR.
The default indicator vector at time t, denoted by dt, is defined as dti = 1 if bank
i defaulted before t, and 0 otherwise, with d0 being the zero vector as all banks are
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assumed to be alive at time zero. For future references, we use ∆dt := dt+1 − dt to
denote the vector indicating the banks defaulting in the time period [t, t+ 1).
Next, we describe the mechanism triggered upon the default of a bank, with
each bank supervised by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The
most common method used by the FDIC to resolve defaults is the Purchase and
Assumption (P&A) transaction 3, where the non-cash assets of the defaulted bank
are sold to an eligible buyer satisfying the minimum capital and cash requirements 4
under the following rules.
Case 1. More than one eligible buyers in the financial sector. The FDIC sells the
defaulted bank to the winning bidder of a first-price sealed-bid auction.
Case 2. Only one eligible buyer in the financial sector. The FDIC sells the defaulted
bank to it through a bargaining process.
Case 3. No eligible buyer in the financial sector. The FDIC sells the defaulted bank
to a company in the real economy through another bargaining process.5
After the defaulted bank is sold, its non-cash assets will be transferred to its buyer,
and the auction payment will be distributed to its creditors based on the relative
fraction of liabilities owed to them.
Next, we explain how to model the above described mechanism starting from the
first case. We follow [Giliberto and Varaiya(1989)] and choose the common value
3Indeed, from 1980 through 1994, the FDIC used P&A transactions to resolve 1,188 out of 1,617
total failures and assistance transactions, or 73.5 percent according to [FDIC(2013)].
4The capital requirement is used by FDIC to determine the bidder eligibility, as described in [Gilib-
erto and Varaiya(1989)]. In general, if a bank does not have sufficient cash to purchase the non-cash
assets of the defaulted bank, it can raise cash from other banks or private sector. We do not model
such a mechanism in this chapter, and hence require that eligible bidders must also have sufficient
cash.
5These cases are used to compute the auction price of a defaulted bank. Depending on the number
of eligible buyers and which sector (financial sector or real economy) those buyers belong to, the
auction price is determined through different mechanisms. The auction price is then redistributed
proportionally to the creditors of the defaulted bank, hence it contributes to reduce the amount of
unrepaid debt from the defaulted bank to its creditors in the network. The difference between the
original liability exposure of bank j to a defaulted bank i and the auction proceeds received by j
when the auction on the assets of bank i is completed may be interpreted as the loss of j given the
default of bank i.
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model to determine the auction price and winning bidder of a first-price sealed-bid
auction. Such a model is justified by their claims that (1) the true value of the
charter of the defaulted bank is nearly the same across bidders, (2) the eligible bidders
may be equally capable of exploiting the defaulted bank’s franchise. Moreover, we
assume that the FDIC selects the eligible bidders using the minimum capital and cash
requirements, set equal to the present value of non-cash assets of bank i, i.e. to ξti .
6
We use Qti to denote the set of eligible bidders participating to bank i’s auction
at time t, i.e.
Qti =
{
j ∈ {1, . . . , n} ∣∣dt+1j = 0,min{qtj, κtj} ≥ ξti } .
We use αti to denote the auction price of bank i, and m
t
i to denote the winning bidder
of bank i. For each bank j ∈ Qti, let btj(i) be the equilibrium price paid by bank j to
purchase the assets of bank i at t.
Denote by xti the reservation price announced at the beginning of the auction by
the FDIC, computed as the fair market value of the non-cash assets of bank iminus the
costs of disposition and marketing. The private valuations of bank i from each bidder
j ∈ Qti, denoted by βtj(i), are assumed to be independently and uniformly distributed
in the interval [xti, y
t
i ], where y
t
i ≤ ξti . Both xti and yti are common knowledge across all
bidders. 7 Using the formula of the equilibrium bid in a first-price sealed-bid auction,










The bidder who places the highest bid wins the auction, i.e. mti = argmaxj∈Qtib
t
j(i),





6Such a quantity is usually computed during an asset valuation review performed by the FDIC,
where the liquidity of all potential bidders is also assessed, see [FDIC(2013)] Chapter 2 for details.
7Notice that each bidder knows the capital and cash requirements, set equal to ξti , as well as the
reservation price xti, given that these are revealed during the information meeting held by the FDIC
before the auction takes place.
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For the second case, while the reservation price of the FDIC for the asset of the
defaulted bank i at time t is xti as in the first case, the reservation price of a buyer
j on bank i’s assets equals its private valuation of bank i, βtj(i). Define the surplus
each party gains by the end of a bargaining process as the difference between their
reservation prices and the equilibrium price. Assuming that both parties have equal
bargaining power, the equilibrium price is defined as the price resulting when each
party takes equal surplus, i.e.
btj(i)− xti = βtj(i)− btj(i).










We remark that such a price coincides with the equilibrium price buyer j would bid
in an auction with two participants.
In the third case, we model companies in the real economy via a sink node in
the network. Whenever a real economy company buys a defaulted bank, the sink
node receives the liabilities transferred from the defaulted bank’s creditors, and the
operating cash inflows generated by the defaulted bank. As in the second case, the
sink node pays the same amount to buy a defaulted bank as when there is only one
buyer in the financial sector.
It remains to specify how non-cash assets are transferred and the auction payment
distributed. In cases when more than one bank defaults at a specific time, our model
assumes that the bank with larger non-cash assets is auctioned first, and all auction
payments are distributed after all non-cash assets are transferred. The ownership
matrix at time t, Ut, is given by uti,j = 1 if bank i is owned by j at time t, and
uti,j = 0 otherwise. By definition, U
0 = In, i.e. the n × n identity matrix. Denote
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the i-th column of matrix U by Ui. After the auction is completed, the ownership










[0]n×1 if ∆dti = 1,
where column k is added to column i, and column k is set to zero if i acquires k at
time t.
If bank i defaults at t, its receivable liabilities and operating cash inflows are
transferred to the winning bidder after the auction is completed. Hence, when taking
into account the default events, the operating cash inflows and liabilities of each bank










, lti,i = 0.
Here, we recall that c˜t and L˜t are the realizations of the operating cash inflow vector
and interbank liability matrix at t. In words, if bank i has not defaulted by time t,
its operating cash inflows also include the ones generated by the banks it buys. If it
defaults, its operating cash inflows are transferred to its buyer. A similar argument











i.e. the present value of the debt owed by i to j netted of the payment done at
the default time. Here, 1A is the indicator function of the event A. The following
inductive relationship allows computing the available cash of bank i before clearing
iteratively

















for t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T−2} with v0i ≥ 0. If bank i has not defaulted by t, the cash available
to bank i before clearing at t + 1 includes the cash available to it after clearing at
t netted of the amount spent to acquire banks which have defaulted at t, plus the
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auction payments proportionally distributed from the FDIC to repay partially or in
full the debt of the defaulted banks at t. On the other hand, if bank i defaults by t,
it does not have any cash available since it has been acquired.
3.2.5 The Controlled Clearing Payment System
We introduce a multi-period controlled clearing payment system, which generalizes
the single period clearing system in [Eisenberg and Noe(2001)]. In each time period,
clearing payments satisfy the standard conditions imposed by bankruptcy laws: lim-
ited liability of equity, priority of liability over equity, and proportional repayments
of liabilities in default. This leads to the following
Definition 3.2.2. Given a dynamic network, {(L˜t, c˜t)}T−1t=0 , a time sequence {pt}T−1t=0
is a clearing sequence of payments controlled by ot if it satisfies the following condi-
tions:
a. Proportional repayment of liabilities. A bank i ∈ {1, . . . , n} pays piti,jpti to bank j
at time t, were bank i not to default before t.
b. Absolute priority. For each t, if a bank i does not default at time t, it pays its
liabilities in full. If it defaults, its repaid liabilities are reduced by the illiquidity
amount remaining after provisions of liquidity loans. If it defaults before time t,





i + min{0, κti + oti}, if dti = 0
0, if dti = 1.
c. Admissible liquidity loans. The LOLR provides loans only to illiquid yet solvent
banks, i.e. for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} at time t,
oti > 0⇒ κti < 0 and qti ≥ 0 and dti = 0.
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When a liquidity loan allocation policy {ot} is specified, the sequence {pt} is
uniquely determined provided that the subgraph of the financial network induced
by the set of non-defaulted banks satisfies, at all times, the regularity condition
introduced in [Eisenberg and Noe(2001)]. Such a condition states that a financial
system is regular if the risk orbit of each bank i, consisting of all banks j reachable
from i via a directed path, is a surplus set. This means that every bank in the set
is not liable to any bank outside it and total operating cash flows of all banks in the
set is positive. A simple sufficient condition guaranteeing this is that operating cash
inflows of all banks are strictly positive at all times. This will be satisfied in our
numerical simulations. We then have the following result, whose proof is reported in
Appendix B.
Lemma 3.2.1. Let the financial network be such that the subgraphs induced by the
non-defaulted banks are regular for all t. Then, if a liquidity loan allocation policy
{ot} is specified, the sequence {pt} is uniquely determined.
3.3 Liquidity Assistance Policies
We analyze systemic risk mitigation resulting from two liquidity assistance strate-
gies. The first, referred to as Systemic Importance Driven (SID), provides liquidity
assistance to a selected set of banks considered systemically important given the
potential losses to the system induced by their defaults. We compare it with a bench-
mark policy, called Max-Liquidity (ML), focusing on maximizing the instantaneous
total liquidity in the system.
In the following, we use st = (vt, dt,Ut) to denote the state of the network.
Here, we recall that the first two components are n-dimensional vectors denoting,
respectively, cash and default indicators associated with each bank, while the last
component is the ownership matrix. Further, X t = (L˜t, c˜t) is the stochastic process
capturing the randomness of the network.
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3.3.1 Systemic Importance Driven (SID)
This policy identifies a set of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs).
Our definition of SIFIs is consistent with [FSB(2011)], which defines financial insti-
tutions to be systemically important if their distress or disorderly failure, because of
their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would cause significant dis-
ruption to the wider financial system and economic activity. However, differently
from [FSB(2011)] which suggests to take preventive measures against these institu-
tions, our policy only provides liquidity assistance to them if they are close to default.
We next describe how the set of SIFIs is constructed. We first simulate sample paths





i , and d
t,a
i the liabilities, clearing payment, available cash after clearing,
and default indicator of bank i, respectively generated or computed at time t on the




i + min{0, κt,ai } if dt,ai = 0
0, if dt,ai = 1,
for t = 0, . . . , T − 1. Then compute $¯i = E
[∑T−1






expected amount of unpaid debt of bank i in the absence of mitigation. Here, $t,ai is
the amount of unpaid debt of bank i on the sample path a computed using Eq. (3.3)
(which in turn uses pt,ai computed above), while ∆d
t,a
i = 1 if bank i defaulted in the
time period [t, t+ 1) on the sample path a. We set z as the threshold value so that
1
n
|{i : $¯i > z}| = 1− ρ
where ρ is a policy parameter governing the percentage of tolerated loss. The set V
of systemically important banks consists of all banks for which the amount of unpaid
debt generated by their default exceeds z, i.e. V = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n}|$¯i ≥ z}. Liquidity
assistance will only be provided to banks belonging to this set. Next, we describe the
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main step of the procedure. Denote the liquidity loan vector by otSI . The clearing
payment is determined by solving the equations below. For i = 1, . . . , n,
pti =

`ti if i ∈ V , dti = 0 and qti ≥ 0
`ti + min{0, κti}, if (i ∈ V , dti = 0 and qti < 0) or (i /∈ V and dti = 0)
0, if dti = 1,
i.e. liquidity loans are only provided to solvent systemically important banks who
are unable to currently fulfill liability obligations. Concretely, each component of the
liquidity loan vector is given by
otSI,i = 1i∈V,dti=0,qti≥0 max{−κti, 0}, i = 1, . . . , n,
where 1i∈V,dti=0,qti≥0 = 1 if i ∈ V , dti = 0 and qti ≥ 0; 0 otherwise.
3.3.2 Maximum Liquidity (ML)
This policy mimics the behavior adopted by regulators when they immediately
want to restore financial stability following a period of financial distress, as also
discussed by [Hoggarth et al.(2004)]. It is myopic, and in each time step selects a
vector otML of liquidity assistance loans so to maximize the total flow of payments,
i.e.






t, ot, X t)− oti
]
.
Here, Ot represents the feasible region satisfying the above definition of controlled
clearing payment sequence. In order to provide a fair comparison between this policy
and SID, we set the initial budget at disposal of the LOLR to be the same as the








−τ . Here, the sequence of vectors {otSI} is obtained
by applying the SID policy on the same network simulation.
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The LOLR will allocate this budget to financially distressed banks ensuring that
















t−τ , t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}.
(3.4)
Notice that κti is the available cash to bank i after clearing occurs at t, and




























From here, we can see that this policy maximizes the total instantaneous liquidity in
the network.
3.4 Systemic Risk Analysis
We develop a simulation based study to assess the amount of systemic risk gen-
erated by the network after controlling for the liquidity assistance policy. First, we
define the fraction of unpaid liabilities caused by defaults occurring in decision epoch





loss at clearing︷ ︸︸ ︷
(`ti − pti(st, ot, X t)) +
loss from auction︷ ︸︸ ︷
max{$ti − αti, 0}]∑n
i=1
∑T−1
t=0 (1 + r)
−t`ti
.
We recall from Section 3.2 that $ti denotes the amount of unpaid debt at time t of
bank i to its creditors and αti the price that the FDIC receives from the winner of the
auction on bank i, if i defaults at t. The amount αti is redistributed proportionally
to bank i’s creditors, hence it contributes to reduce the amount of unrepaid debt
from i to its creditors in the network. Hence, ULt is a random variable representing
the fraction of liabilities unpaid by the banks in the network at time t relative to the
amount of total interbank liabilities over the entire time horizon, and after accounting
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for the assistance policy ot by the lender of last resort. Clearly, the above quantity is
zero if no default occurs at t. In this case, `ti = p
t
i(s
t, ot, X t) and $ti = α
t
i = 0 for each
i, given that no auction takes place. The systemic risk allocated to time t is defined
as the expected value of such percentage, i.e.









3.4.1 Core-Periphery and Random Networks
We fix the number of network nodes to n = 21, including twenty bank nodes and
a sink non-bank node as defined in Section 3.2. We consider two network topologies,
core-periphery and random networks. The findings of [Craig and Von Peter(2014)]
and [Fricke and Lux(2015)] guide the design of the core-periphery network structure.





It consists of a complete block (denoted by 1) and a zero block (0) on the diagonal,
specifying relations within the core and peripheral tiers. More specifically, each core
bank transacts with any other core bank, but peripheral banks do not directly interact
with each other. The two off-diagonal blocks specify relations between the tiers: the
core-to-periphery block (CP) must be row-regular (RR), i.e. it must have at least
a one in every row, while the periphery-to-core block (PC) must be column-regular
(CR), i.e. have at least a one in every column. This means that each core bank is
liable to at least one peripheral bank, and each core bank must lend to at least one
peripheral bank. Notice that such a model only specifies the market structure since
the size of M and its blocks can vary over time. We initialize the network with 4
core banks and 16 peripheral banks, see Figure 3.1 for an illustration of the network
configuration. Then, we use the following transition probability matrix to determine
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migrations from core to periphery and vice versa. Let ψ, ψ′ ∈ {Core,Periphery}. The







[Fricke and Lux(2015)] find that the core banks are significantly larger and more
active than peripheral banks. Further, [Craig and Von Peter(2014)] estimate the ratio
of core to peripheral average banks’ asset sizes to be 51 (see section 4.1 therein). We
recall that the initial book value of bank i’s assets is given by its currently available
cash plus the present values of its operating cash inflows and total lending amount.
We thus choose the total lending amount, operating cash inflows, and initial cash of
core banks to be 51 times as large as the corresponding quantities of peripheral banks.
Moreover, we set the size of interbank loans between core banks to be 50 times as
large as the lending amount from peripheral to core banks. The lending amount from
core to peripheral banks is chosen to be of the same size as the lending amount from
peripheral to core banks.
It is well understood that the interbank liability matrix cannot be reconstructed
with 100% accuracy since the only publicly available information are total interbank
liabilities and claims. For this reason, we estimate the relative liability matrix using
the entropy maximization method proposed by [Upper and Worms(2004)]. This ap-
proach effectively assumes that banks diversify their claims and liabilities by spreading
their lending and borrowing across all other banks in the system. In the absence of
any prior information about the interbank liability matrix, this method provides a
consistent way to estimate it by minimizing the amount of prior information built
into the distribution of interbank liabilities. We report the details of such estimation
method in Appendix C.
8The numerical values closely resemble the estimates provided by [Craig and Von Peter(2014)] (see
equation (7) therein). While they also assign a positive probability to exit the network to each
bank, in our model the exit of bank from the network is determined by the occurrence of a default
event. We adjust for it by redistributing the probability of exiting network to migrating to core or
periphery status.
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Figure 3.1. Left panel: Core-periphery network at time t = 0. Node
1-4 are core banks, and node 5-20 are peripheral banks. Right panel:
random network at time t = 0.
As a benchmark comparison, we consider a random network of interbank loans,
which decouples the relation between the distribution of banks’ sizes and the network
structure. To facilitate the comparison, we take the number of banks to be the same
as in the core-periphery network, and choose the total liabilities and claims of each
bank to be the average of the corresponding quantities in the core block of the core-
periphery network. As for the core-periphery network, we use the method of entropy
maximization 9 to generate the interbank liability matrix.
Under both network topologies, during any auction each bidder’s private valuation
of the non-cash assets of a defaulted bank is assumed to be uniformly distributed in
an interval whose right extreme is the mean of its non-cash assets, and whose left
extreme is the mean minus one standard deviation.
We use the coefficient of variation, given by the ratio of the standard deviation of
interbank liabilities to its mean, to measure the normalized dispersion of the proba-
bility distribution of liabilities. We assume it to be the same for all banks.
9See Appendix C for details.
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3.4.2 Simulation Results
We fix the number of Monte-Carlo runs to 2,000. We set the time horizon to
T = 20. The time step used in the simulation is ∆t = 1, resulting in twenty payment
periods. The time sequences of outstanding liabilities and claims of each bank in
the network are chosen to be two sequences of independent Gaussian distributed
random variables. For each bank, its operating cash inflows are a time sequence of
independently distributed Gaussian random variables. Operating cash inflows of any
pair of banks in the network are independent. More specifically, in core-periphery
networks we set the means of total liabilities of a periphery bank to $5,000 and of a
core bank to $255, 000 = 51 × $5, 000. Further, the means of operating cash inflows
are set to $500 for periphery banks and to $25, 500 = 51 × $500. We set the means
of total liabilities and of operating cash inflows of each bank to $55,000 and $5,500,
respectively, in the random network. These values are the average of the means
of total liabilities and operating cash inflows over all banks in the core-periphery
network.
In all plots, the systemic risk reduction is computed as the difference between the
average systemic risk obtained after policy control and the corresponding quantity
in the absence of mitigation. Default reduction is the difference between the average
number of defaulted banks after policy control and without mitigation.
We illustrate the sensitivity of systemic risk to the different structural network
parameters. In both network configurations, as variation in interbank liabilities in-
creases, the difference between received assets and due liabilities of each bank experi-
ences higher fluctuations, making each bank more vulnerable and increasing systemic
risk. In the core-periphery network, if the budget is sufficient, ML can rescue all
banks and hence reduce systemic risk. On the other hand, if the budget is not suffi-
cient, ML may choose to rescue banks which are not systemically important in order
to maximize the total liquidity in the system. When liabilities have larger variation,
a higher number of banks becomes systemically important and consequently the sys-
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temic risk resulting from their failures gets larger. This is reflected in Figure 3.1(a)
showing that the SID policy achieves a better reduction in systemic risk relatively to
the ML policy when the coefficient of variation becomes sufficiently high.
Conversely, in the random network, the ML policy achieves better systemic risk
reduction as shown in Figure 3.1(b). Since all banks are equally systemically im-
portant, it is preferable to utilize in full the available budget to rescue banks and
maximize the total liquidity in the network rather than spending the budget only to
assist a specific set of target banks identified by the SID policy. On the other hand,
the ML policy is not as effective in reducing the number of defaults. Under SID, a
larger number of banks default in early periods (see Figure 3.5(b)) because they may
not be systemically important and hence are not rescued. The cash proceeds coming
from the liquidation of their noncash assets through the auction make surviving banks
able to later fulfill liability obligations even without liquidity assistance.
As correlation increases and interbank liabilities manifest stronger comovement,
systemic risk tends to decrease. This is because, in aggregate, the payment amount
that each bank receives from others in the network approaches the total value of its
outstanding liabilities hence resulting in smaller systemic risk. As a consequence, the
impact of mitigation becomes less important. This is reflected in Figure 3.3 showing
that the systemic risk reduction monotonically decreases with correlation. Neverthe-
less, SID still achieves a superior performance both in terms of systemic risk reduction
and diminished number of defaults in the core-periphery network, while ML has bet-
ter reduction in systemic risk and worse reduction in number of defaults in random
networks. Note that as correlation increases, SID achieves a similar performance to
ML in the core-periphery network. This is because the stronger comovement in li-
abilities decreases the difference in systemic importance of the banks. As a result,
both SID and ML target banks of similar systemic importance.
As expected, systemic risk increases if the percentage ρ of tolerated loss increases
(when the tolerated loss rate approaches 100% no mitigation is applied). Figure 3.4
shows that the gap between the systemic risk reduction obtained by SID and ML is
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very small when no loss or full loss is tolerated. In the first case, the budget used by
SID is large enough to allow both policies to completely eliminate systemic risk. In the
second case, the opposite happens and both policies use very little budget resulting in
high systemic risk. However, when the tolerated amount of loss is at an intermediate
level hence requiring a careful budget allocation, rescuing systemically important
banks achieves higher systemic risk reduction in the core-periphery network.
In order to illustrate the dependence of systemic risk on the topology of core-
periphery networks, we consider what happens when the persistence over time of the
network structure decreases. If the probability that a bank migrates from core to
periphery increases, the network would have a higher number of non-systemically
important banks. As a consequence, we expect smaller systemic risk levels and a de-
creasing need of using mitigation policies. This is reflected in Figure 3.5 which further
confirms that systemic risk is driven by heterogeneity in sizes and connectedness of
banks.
Figure 3.5(a) shows the contagious effect exerted by the core banks in the core-
periphery network. The SID policy focuses on rescuing core banks. On the other
hand, ML can choose to rescue periphery banks in the intent of maximizing the total
liquidity in the system sacrificing systemically important core banks. The right graph
of Figure 3.6(a) indicates that this can generate failures of other core banks in the
network and present higher systemic risk. Notice that when the auction proceeds
coming from the failure of these banks are redistributed to others in the network, it
increases their cash reserves and make them able to later fulfill liability obligations.
This explains why, under the ML policy and in the absence of mitigation, the level
of systemic risk decreases and the cumulative number of defaults stays constant after
a certain time epoch. Unlike the core-periphery network, in the random network
the cash proceeds resulting from the auction of noncash assets of defaulted banks
do not sufficently increase the cash reserves of surviving banks. Hence, default keep
occurring at later times as Figure 3.6(b) shows.
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(a) Core-periphery Network
































































































Figure 3.2. The left panels report the dependence of systemic risk
reduction on the coefficient of variation of liabilities. The right panels
show the same dependence for the default reduction. Interbank lia-
bilities are assumed to be uncorrelated, the percentage ρ of tolerated
loss is 20%, and the probability of migrating from core to periphery
is 0.1. The 95% confidence band is superimposed in all plots.
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(a) Core-periphery Network



























































































Figure 3.3. The left panels report the dependence of systemic risk
reduction on the correlation of interbank liabilities, while the right
panels show the same dependence for the default reduction. We fix
the coefficient of variation to 0.5, the percentage ρ of tolerated loss to
20%, and the probability of migrating from core to periphery to 0.1.
The 95% confidence band is superimposed in all plots.
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(a) Core-periphery Network
































































































Figure 3.4. The left panels report the systemic risk reduction as the
percentage ρ of tolerated loss increases. The right panels show the the
same dependence for the default reduction. We set the coefficient of
variation to 0.5, interbank liabilities correlation to 0, and the proba-
bility of migrating from core to periphery to 0.1. The 95% confidence
band is superimposed in all plots.
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(a)























































































Figure 3.5. (a): The left panel shows the systemic risk with respect
to the probability of migrating from core to periphery. The right
panel shows the same dependence for the number of defaults. (b):
The left panel shows the systemic risk reduction with respect to this
migration probability. The right panel shows the same dependence
for the default reduction. We fix the coefficient of variation to 0.5,
interbank liabilities correlation to 0, and percentage ρ of tolerated loss
to 20%. The 95% confidence band is superimposed in all plots.
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(a) Core-periphery Network














































Figure 3.6. (a): The left panel shows the evolution of systemic risk
over time for a core-periphery network. The right panel shows the
systemic risk breakdown into contributions from core and peripheral
banks. Core and peripheral banks are denoted by C and P respec-
tively. (b): Evolution of systemic risk over time for a random network.
The middle plot zooms on the curves between times 2 and 20 so to
illustrate the difference between the policies in these time periods. We
set the coefficient of variation to 0.5, zero correlation between inter-
bank liabilities, ρ = 20%, and the probability of migrating from core
to periphery to 0.1.
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(a) Core-periphery Network





















































































Figure 3.7. (a): The left panel shows the cumulative number of de-
faults over time for a core-periphery network. The right panel gives a
breakdown into defaults of core and peripheral banks. Core and pe-
ripheral banks are denoted by C and P respectively. (b): Cumulative
number of defaults over time for a random network. We set the coef-
ficient of variation to 0.5, no correlation between interbank liabilities,




This thesis extends the systemic risk literature in two directions. Chapter 2 provides
an analytical tool to compare financial networks. We have focused on the relation
between the topology of the network and the loss profile of the financial system. To
be more specific, we have used vector majorization to express preferences between
losses and matrix majorization to compare networks in terms of interbank liabilities
concentration. The notions of balancing and unbalancing network have been devel-
oped to illustrate the different impact that concentration of interbank liabilities can
have on systemic risk.
Our main result is that higher liability concentration leads to larger systemic losses
in unbalancing (highly capitalized) financial networks, while the opposite is true in
balancing (lowly capitalized) systems. For regulatory purposes, it is desirable for
the network to be in a state which is both balancing and unbalancing as this would
reduced losses to the minimum extent. We have shown how our framework can be
specialized to reproduce tiered systems, identified by recent empirical studies as good
descriptors of real-world financial networks. Our results indicate that an imperfectly
tiered is preferred to a perfectly tiered structure if the state of the financial network is
unbalancing, whereas the opposite preference relation holds if the state is balancing.
We have conducted an empirical analysis of the network formed by the eight largest
European banking sectors and found that the state of the financial network is either
unbalancing or close to it, consistently over a period of seven years. Such an analysis,
along with the theoretical predictions of our study, indicates that it is advisable to
avoid concentration of gross exposures, as they would have serious systemic effects in
unbalancing systems.
Chapter 3 develops a multi-period controlled clearing payment system building on
the framework of [Eisenberg and Noe(2001)]. We have introduced an outside entity
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whose goal is to provide liquidity assistance loans to financially distressed banks so to
reduce the level of systemic risk within the network. Our network consists of insured
commercial banks supervised by the FDIC, which sells non-cash assets of defaulted
banks via a first-price sealed-bid auction.
We have focused our analysis on two network configurations, the empirically driven
core-periphery topology, and a baseline random network. We have illustrated the
systemic risk mitigation effect of two liquidity assistance policies, Systemic Impor-
tance Driven and Maximum Liquidity. Our simulation based study shows that in
the core-periphery network, strategies maximizing the total liquidity of the system
may not reduce systemic risk and number of defaults. This is because the failure
of systemically important banks can have contagious effects which propagate wider
in the financial system. Such systemic effects would be mitigated by the SID policy
which targets a class of banks with the highest default consequences in the system.
If each bank is equally systemically important, as it is the case in a random network,
the Max-Liquidity policy achieves better systemic risk reduction than SID given that
it greedily allocates its available budget to prevent any failure rather than failures of
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APPENDIX A. CHAPTER 2 PROOFS AND AUXILIARY RESULTS
Proof of Lemma 2.3.1. We first prove the sufficient condition. Let x ∈ A. For
notational convenience, we omit the dependence of ν(A) on A. For j = 1, . . . , n− 1,



























































k = 1, . . . , n. This shows that xD is similarly ordered to x and D is order preserving
with respect to A. Next, we prove the necessary condition. Let m = mini∈{1,...,n}{zi}.
For k = 1, . . . , n, choose x ∈ A such that x(n) = x(n−1) = · · · = x(k) = m and
x(k−1) = x(k−2) = · · · = x(1) = 0 if k > 1, and x(n) = x(n−1) = · · · = x(k) = m if k = 1.
Because xD is similarly ordered to x, it holds that for j = 1, . . . , n− 1,




























i,j ≥ 0 holds for
j = 1, . . . , n− 1, k = 1, . . . , n.
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Proof of Lemma 2.3.2. First, we prove the sufficient condition in the first state-
ment. Let x, y ∈ A, x ≺w y. For notational convenience, we omit the dependence of












































where the first equality follows from the fact that D is order preserving w.r.t. A. The







i,j for i = 2, . . . , n. Hence, using the definition of weak submajorization,
xD ≺w yD.
We then prove the necessary condition in the first statement. Choose x, y ∈ A
such that 0 ≤ x(t) < y(t), y(t) − x(t) = x(t−1) − y(t−1) for some t ∈ {2, . . . , n} and












y(i) for u = 1, . . . , n, u 6= t, (A.2)
and x ≺w y. Because D is order and weak submajorization preserving w.r.t. A, the























0 for k = 1, . . . , n. This concludes the proof of the first statement.
The proof for the second statement follows using similar arguments as above.




j=1[yD]νj ≥ 0 for
k = 1, . . . , n, x, y ∈ A. This can be done by expanding vector-matrix products and
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combining terms in a similar way as done for the inequality (A.1). Next, we show
the necessity of the condition. Choose x, y ∈ A such that x(t) > y(t) ≥ 0, x(t) − y(t) =











for k = 1, . . . , n. We conclude the proof following similar arguments as in the proof
of the first statement.
Proof of Lemma 2.3.3. For notational convenience, we set Π˜ := (1 + γ)Π and
c˜ := (1+γ)c−γ`. As pointed out in [Eisenberg and Noe(2001)], the clearing payment
vector p∗ is obtained as the solution to the following optimization problem:
max
x
f(x), s.t. x(I− Π˜) ≤ c˜, 0 ≤ x ≤ `,
where the objective function f is any real valued increasing function of the vector x.
Multiplying both sides of the first constraint by (1− α), with α ∈ [0, 1), will lead to
an equivalent optimization problem. But this leads to
x[I− (1− α)Π˜− αI] ≤ (1− α)c˜.
That is, if we replace Π˜ by the matrix Πα,γ := (1−α)Π˜+αI and c˜ by cα,γ := (1−α)c˜,
the clearing payment vector stays the same.
Lemma A.1. Let (Πa, `, c, γ) and (Πb, `, c, γ) be two financial systems. If there exists
α so that Πaα,γ ≺ Πbα,γ and Πaα,γ 6 Πbα,γ, then it must hold that Πaβ,γ 6 Πbβ,γ for all
β ∈ [0, 1), β 6= α.






β,γ, β 6= α,
so that A ≺ B and A 6 B, but C  D. Denote by Xk the k-th row of the matrix















Di(j) for any k = 1, . . . , n. (A.4)
Next, we show that Eq. (A.3) and Eq. (A.4) cannot hold simultaneously. Let
h,m,w, z be such that Ai(h) = B
i




(z) = β. We first discuss the
implications of Eq. (A.3) using a case-by-case analysis based on g.
• g > max{h,m}. Using the definition of relaxed equivalent version, we obtain
g∑
j=1,j 6=h













(1− α)(1 + γ)Πa,i(j) >
g∑
j=1
(1− α)(1 + γ)Πb,i(j). (A.5)
















leading to the inequality (A.5).






























(1− α)(1 + γ)Πa,i(j) >
m∑
j=1
(1− α)(1 + γ)Πb,i(j). (A.6)
• g < min{h,m}. Eq. (A.3) directly leads to
g+1∑
j=1
(1− α)(1 + γ)Πa,i(j) >
g+1∑
j=1
(1− α)(1 + γ)Πb,i(j), g < min{h,m}. (A.7)
Next, we discuss the implications of Eq. (A.4) and show that it leads to
k∑
j=1
(1− β)(1 + γ)Πa,i(j) ≤
k∑
j=1
(1− β)(1 + γ)Πb,i(j), k = 1, . . . , n. (A.8)
This is done via a case-by-case analysis based on k.
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• k > max{w, z}. We obtain
k∑
j=1,j 6=w










hence implying the inequality (A.8).
• k < min{w, z}. Eq. (A.4) directly leads to inequality (A.8).

















which further leads to the inequality (A.8).
• w ≤ k ≤ z. We obtain
k∑
j=1,j 6=w













which again leads to the inequality (A.8).
Setting k = g in Eq. (A.8) shows that Eq. (A.5) and Eq. (A.8) cannot hold
simultaneously. Setting k = m, we obtain that Eq. (A.6) and Eq. (A.8) cannot hold
simultaneously. Setting k = g + 1, we obtain that Eq. (A.7) and Eq. (A.8) cannot
hold simultaneously. This ends the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2.3.4. We prove the first statement by showing that `Π + c ≥ `.
















`(1) − [(1 + γ)c− γ`](1) , 0
}]
+ 1c(1)≥`(1)`(1)
≥ 1c(1)<`(1)`(1) + 1c(1)≥`(1)`(1) ≥ `(1) ,
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where 1A denotes the indicator function of the event A. Because (Π, `, c, γ) is un-
balancing, by definition it satisfies the inequalities (2.5). Combining those with the















i,1 + c(1) − `(1) ≥ 0,
which proves the first statement.











for j = 1, . . . , n− 1 (recall here that µ has been defined above Definition 2.3.6). Such
a system (Π, `, c, γ) satisfies the inequalities (2.5), but (` + )Π + c 6≥ ` + . Hence,
this system is unbalancing but p∗(Π, `+ , c, γ) 6≥ `+ .
For any vector x ∈ Rn, define
∆x :=
(
0, x(2) − x(1), x(3) − x(2), . . . x(n) − x(n−1)
)
,
i.e., the vector whose components are the increments from one component to the next
rank ordered component in the original vector x.
Lemma A.2. Let x, y ∈ Rn≥0 such that x and y are similarly ordered. If ∆x ≤ ∆y,
then ∆(x ∧ y) ≤ ∆y. Vice versa, if ∆x ≥ ∆y, then ∆(x ∧ y) ≥ ∆y.
Proof. We first prove that ∆x ≤ ∆y ⇒ ∆(x ∧ y) ≤ ∆y. For i = 1, . . . , n− 1,







x(i+1) − x(i) if x(i+1) ≤ y(i+1) and x(i) ≤ y(i)
x(i+1) − y(i) if x(i+1) ≤ y(i+1) and x(i) ≥ y(i)
y(i+1) − y(i) if x(i+1) ≥ y(i+1) and x(i) ≥ y(i)
≤ y(i+1) − y(i) = ∆yi+1,
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where we have used the assumption that x is similarly ordered to y. Notice that the
case x(i+1) ≥ y(i+1) and x(i) ≤ y(i) is not listed because it violates the assumption that
∆x ≤ ∆y. Hence, ∆(x ∧ y) ≤ ∆y.
We next show that ∆x ≥ ∆y ⇒ ∆(x ∧ y) ≥ ∆y. This holds because







x(i+1) − x(i) if x(i+1) ≤ y(i+1) and x(i) ≤ y(i)
y(i+1) − x(i) if x(i+1) ≥ y(i+1) and x(i) ≤ y(i)
y(i+1) − y(i) if x(i+1) ≥ y(i+1) and x(i) ≥ y(i)
≥ y(i+1) − y(i) = ∆yi+1,
where the second equality follows from the assumption that x is similarly ordered to
y. The third equality does not include the case x(i+1) ≤ y(i+1) and x(i) ≥ y(i) because
such a case violates the assumption that ∆x ≥ ∆y.
The next lemma shows that if a payment vector has smaller (larger) variation
than the liability vector, such a relation is preserved if both vectors are multiplied by
an order preserving relaxed equivalent version of the relative liability matrix.
Lemma A.3. If Πα,γ := (piα,γ,i,j)
n
i,j=1 is order preserving w.r.t. P, for any p ∈ P it
must hold that
(I) ∆p ≤ ∆` implies that ∆ (pΠα,γ) ≤ ∆ (`Πα,γ).
(II) ∆p ≥ ∆` implies that ∆ (pΠα,γ) ≥ ∆
([
`− (`(1) − p(1))]Πα,γ).
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Proof. For j = 1, . . . , n− 1, p ∈ P ,




















































Applying Lemma 2.3.1 with A = P we deduce that ∑ni=k piµα,γ,i,j+1 − piµα,γ,i,j ≥ 0 for
k = 1, . . . , n. If ∆p ≤ ∆`, then [∆(`Πα,γ)]i+1 − [∆(pΠα,γ)]i+1 ≥ 0 because ` ≥ p and∑n
i=k pi
µ
α,γ,i,j+1 − piµα,γ,i,j ≥ 0 for k = 1, . . . , n. This proves (I). Vice versa, if ∆p ≥ ∆`
then












α,γ,i,j+1 − piµα,γ,i,j ≥ 0 for k = 1, . . . , n. This proves (II).
The next lemma shows that if the financial system is balancing (unbalancing), the
vector of asset values before clearing under the base (reduced) liability configuration
has smaller (larger) variation than the liability vector. Moreover, if the payment
vector has smaller (larger) variation than the liability vector, then the assets after
payments are settled also have smaller (larger) variation than the liabilities.
Lemma A.4. Let (Π, `, c, γ) be a financial system and Πα,γ be an α-relaxed equivalent
version which is order preserving w.r.t. P.
(I) If (Π, `, c, γ) is balancing, then
• ∆(`Πα,γ + cα,γ) ≤ ∆`.
• ∆p ≤ ∆` implies that ∆(pΠα,γ + cα,γ) ≤ ∆` for p ∈ P.
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(II) If (Π, `, c, γ) is unbalancing, then
• ∆ (`Πα,γ + cα,γ) ≥ ∆`.
• ∆p ≥ ∆` implies that ∆(pΠα,γ + cα,γ) ≥ ∆` for p ∈ P such that p ≥
[(1 + γ)c− γ`] ∧ `.
Proof. (I)
[∆(`Πα,γ + cα,γ)]j
= [∆ (α`+ (1− α) [`(1 + γ)Π + (1 + γ)c− γ`])]j









+ (1 + γ)
(
c(j) − c(j−1)
)− γ (`(j) − `(j−1))]
≤ α(`(j) − `(j−1)) + (1− α)
[
(1 + γ)(`(j) − `(j−1))− γ(`(j) − `(j−1))
]
= [∆`]j ,
for j = 2, . . . , n. The second equality holds because Πα,γ is order preserving w.r.t. P
and (1 + γ)c− γ` is similarly ordered to `. The inequality follows from the fact that
the system is balancing.
Next, by Lemma A.3 (I), ∆p ≤ ∆` implies that
∆(pΠα,γ + cα,γ) ≤ ∆(`Πα,γ + cα,γ) ≤ ∆`,
where the first inequality holds because Πα,γ is order preserving w.r.t. P , and cα,γ
and p are similarly ordered to `.
(II)
[∆(`Πα,γ + cα,γ)]j
= [∆ (α`+ (1− α) [`(1 + γ)Π + (1 + γ)c− γ`])]j









+ (1 + γ)
(
c(j) − c(j−1)
)− γ (`(j) − `(j−1))]





+ (1− α) [(1 + γ) (`(j) − `(j−1))− γ (`(j) − `(j−1))] = [∆`]j ,
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for j = 2, . . . , n. The second equality follows from the fact that Πα,γ is order pre-
serving w.r.t. P , the fact that both (1 + γ)c − γ` and ` are similarly ordered to `,
and the equality ∆` = ∆`. The inequality comes from the fact that the system is
unbalancing.
Next, by Lemma A.3 (II), ∆p ≥ ∆` implies
∆(pΠα,γ + cα,γ) ≥ ∆
(
(`− (`(1) − p(1)))Πα,γ + cα,γ)
) ≥ ∆(`Πα,γ + cα,γ) ≥ ∆`,
where the first inequality follows because Πα,γ is order preserving w.r.t. P , and cα,γ,
p, and `− (`(1) − p(1)) are similarly ordered to `. The second inequality follows from
the inequality
`(1) − p(1) ≤ `(1) − [[(1 + γ)c− γ`] ∧ `](1) = max
{
`(1) − [(1 + γ)c− γ`](1) , 0
}
,
the inequality ∆((`− (`(1)− p(1)))Πα,γ) ≥ ∆(`Πα,γ) which is implied by Lemma 2.3.1
(choosing D = Πα,γ and A = P therein), and using the assumption that p ≥
[(1 + γ)c− γ`] ∧ `.
The following lemma gives some useful properties of the vector sequence converg-
ing to the clearing payment vector.
Lemma A.5. Let (Π, `, c, γ) be a financial system. Suppose there exists α ∈ [0, 1)
such that Πα,γ is order preserving w.r.t. to P. Define the vector valued function
F (p; Πα,γ, `, cα,γ) := ` ∧ (pΠα,γ + cα,γ) , and a sequence of vectors {fu}∞u=0 given by
fu := F (fu−1) and f0 := `. The following statements hold:
(I) fu is similarly ordered to ` and {fu}∞u=0 decreasingly converges to p∗(Π, `, c, γ).
(II) If (Π, `, c, γ) is balancing, then ∆fu ≤ ∆` and ∆(fuΠα,γ + cα,γ) ≤ ∆`.
(III) If (Π, `, c, γ) is unbalancing, then ∆fu ≥ ∆` and ∆(fuΠα,γ + cα,γ) ≥ ∆`.
Proof. (I) It has been proven in [Eisenberg and Noe(2001)], Lemma 5, that fu de-
creasingly converges to p∗(Π, `, c, γ). The statement that fu is similarly ordered to `
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follows from the fact that Πα,γ is order preserving and from the assumption that cα,γ
is similarly ordered to `.
(II) We prove that ∆fu ≤ ∆` and ∆(fuΠα,γ +cα,γ) ≤ ∆` by induction. For u = 0,
we know that f0 = `. Clearly, ∆f0 ≤ ∆`. From the assumptions that (Π, `, c, γ) is
balancing and Πα,γ is order preserving w.r.t. P , it follows that ∆(`Πα,γ + cα,γ) ≤ ∆`
from Lemma A.4 (I). Hence, ∆(f0Πα,γ +cα,γ) ≤ ∆`. Next, we prove the statement for
u+ 1 assuming that it holds for u. Since Πα,γ is order preserving w.r.t. P , fu ∈ P ,
and cα,γ is similarly ordered to `, it follows that fuΠα,γ + cα,γ is similarly ordered to
`. Hence fu+1 = ` ∧ (fuΠα,γ + cα,γ) is similarly ordered to `. Using the induction
hypothesis that ∆(fuΠα,γ + cα,γ) ≤ ∆` and Lemma A.2, we obtain
∆fu+1 = ∆ [` ∧ (fuΠα,γ + cα,γ)] ≤ ∆`.
Since (Π, `, c, γ) is balancing, Πα,γ is order preserving w.r.t. P , and fu+1 ∈ P , we
can apply Lemma A.4 (I) and deduce that ∆(fu+1Πα,γ + cα,γ) ≤ ∆`. This concludes
the induction.
(III) Using the fact that {fu} is a decreasing sequence converging to p∗ and p∗ ≥
[(1 + γ)c− γ`]∧`, we deduce that fu ≥ [(1 + γ)c− γ`]∧`. Then, applying Lemma A.4
(II), we can use similar arguments as in (II) to conclude the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.1. Letting u → ∞ in Lemma A.5 (I) leads to p∗ being
similarly ordered to `, hence yielding (I). Moreover, we obtain ∆p∗ ≤ ∆` for balancing
financial systems and ∆p∗ ≥ ∆` for unbalancing financial systems from (II) and (III)
in Lemma A.5. It then follows that
`[i] − p∗[i] ≥ `[i] − p∗[i] − ([∆`]n−i+1 − [∆p∗]n−i+1) = `[i+1] − p∗[i+1], i = 1, . . . , n− 1
for balancing financial systems, and
`(i) − p∗(i)≥`(i) − p∗(i) + ([∆`]i+1 − [∆p∗]i+1) = `(i+1) − p∗(i+1), i = 1, . . . , n− 1
for unbalancing financial systems.
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The following lemma provides sufficient conditions under which the minimum
operation preserves the weak majorization relation. This is needed in the following
proofs, given that the clearing payment is given by the minimum between two vectors.
Lemma A.6. Let x, y, z ∈ Rn≥0 such that x and y are similarly ordered to z.
(I) If z[i] ≤ a[i] implies z[k] ≤ a[k] for k > i , a ∈ {x, y}, then x ≺w y implies
(x ∧ z) ≺w (y ∧ z).
(II) If z(i) ≤ a(i) implies z(k) ≤ a(k) for k > i , a ∈ {x, y}, then x ≺w y implies
(x ∧ z) ≺w (y ∧ z).
Proof. (I) Because x and y are similarly ordered to z, clearly, (x ∧ z) and (y ∧ z) are












for k = 1, . . . , n. (A.9)
Let mx = min{i = 1, . . . , n|z[i] ≤ x[i]} and my = min{i = 1, . . . , n|z[i] ≤ y[i]}. It must






























































where 1A denotes the indicator function of the event A. The above inequality follows
from x ≺w y. Using inequalities (A.10) and (A.11), we obtain the inequality in (A.9).
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(II) Because x and y are similarly ordered to z, clearly, (x ∧ z) and (y ∧ z) are












for k = 1, . . . , n. (A.12)
Let mx = min{i = 1, . . . , n|z(i) ≤ x(i)} and my = min{i = 1, . . . , n|z(i) ≤ y(i)}. For



































































where the inequality follows from x ≺w y. Using inequalities (A.13) and (A.14), we
obtain the inequality (A.12).
Proof of Theorem 2.3.1. Recall from Lemma A.5 that a sequence of vectors
{fu(Πα,γ)}∞u=0,
where
F (p,Πα,γ; `, cα,γ) := ` ∧ (pΠα,γ + cα,γ)
fu(Πα,γ) := F (fu−1(Πα,γ),Πα,γ)
f0(Πα,γ) := `,
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converges to the clearing payment vector p∗. Hence, proving that p∗(Πaα,γ, `, cα,γ) ≺w
p∗(Πbα,γ, `, cα,γ) is equivalent to showing that fu(Π
a
α,γ) ≺w fu(Πbα,γ) for u = 1, 2, . . . .





∗(Πzα,γ, `, cα,γ) by p
z∗.
Next, we prove that fau ≺w f bu by induction. Without loss of generality, we take
Πaα,γ to be weak submajorization preserving w.r.t. P . (If it were the case that Πbα,γ
is weak submajorization preserving w.r.t. P , we would obtain the same result and
the proof would proceed in a symmetric fashion by interchanging the roles of a and
b.) For u = 0, we have fa0 = ` ≺w ` = f b0 . Assume fau ≺w f bu. Then we want to prove





) ≺w (f buΠaα,γ + cα,γ) ≺w (f buΠbα,γ + cα,γ) .
The first inequality follows from the assumption that Πaα,γ is order and weak subma-
jorization preserving, the fact that fau , f
b
u are similarly ordered to ` by Lemma A.5,
and Assumption 2.3.1 that cα,γ is similarly ordered to `. The second inequality follows
from the majorization inequality Πaα,γ ≺ Πbα,γ, along with the fact that Πaα,γ and Πbα,γ
are both order preserving w.r.t. P . For z ∈ {a, b}, since ∆(f zuΠzα,γ + cα,γ) ≤ ∆` (by
Lemma A.5 (II)), `[i] ≤ (f zuΠzα,γ + cα,γ)[i] we must have that `[k] ≤ (f zuΠzα,γ + cα,γ)[k]
for k > i. Moreover, f zuΠ
z




` ∧ (fauΠaα,γ + cα,γ)
] ≺w [` ∧ (f buΠbα,γ + cα,γ)] = f bu+1
by taking x = fauΠ
a




α,γ + cα,γ, and z = `. This concludes the proof
that fau ≺w f bu for u = 1, 2, . . . .






fau,[i] ≥ 0 for k = 1, . . . , n.






pa∗[i] ≥ 0 for k = 1, . . . , n, hence, pa∗ ≺w pb∗.
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`[i] − pa∗[i] ≥
k∑
i=1




for k = 1, . . . , n, or equivalently s(Πa, `, c, γ) w s(Πb, `, c, γ).
Proof of Theorem 2.3.2. Similarly to the proof for Theorem 2.3.1, proving that
p∗(Πaα,γ, `, cα,γ) ≺w p∗(Πbα,γ, `, cα,γ) is equivalent to showing that fu(Πaα,γ) ≺w fu(Πbα,γ)







Next, we prove fau ≺w f bu by induction. Without loss of generality, we take Πaα,γ
to be weak supermajorization preserving w.r.t. P . (If Πbα,γ were to be weak super-
majorization preserving w.r.t. P , we would obtain the same result and the proof
would proceed in a symmetric fashion by interchanging the roles of a and b.) For
u = 0, by definition, fa0 = ` ≺w ` = f b0 . Assume fau ≺w f bu. Then we want to prove





) ≺w (f buΠaα,γ + cα,γ) ≺w (f buΠbα,γ + cα,γ) ,
where the first inequality follows from the assumption that Πaα,γ is order and weak
supermajorization preserving w.r.t. P and the fact that fau and f bu are similarly
ordered to ` by Lemma A.5 and cα,γ is similarly ordered to ` in light of Assumption
2.3.1; the second inequality is due to that Πaα,γ ≺ Πbα,γ, and Πaα,γ and Πbα,γ are order
preserving w.r.t. P . For z ∈ {a, b}, because ∆(f zuΠzα,γ + cα,γ) ≥ ∆` (by Lemma A.5
(III)), `(i) ≤ (f zuΠzα,γ + cα,γ)(i) must imply that `(k) ≤ (f zuΠzα,γ + cα,γ)(k) for k > i.
Moreover, f zuΠ
z
α,γ + cα,γ is similarly ordered to `. Applying Lemma A.6 (II) with
x = fauΠ
a




α,γ + cα,γ, and z = `, we deduce
fau+1 =
[
` ∧ (fauΠaα,γ + cα,γ)
] ≺w [` ∧ (f buΠbα,γ + cα,γ)] = f bu+1.
This concludes the proof that fau ≺w f bu for u = 1, 2, . . . .
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fau,(i) ≤ 0 for k = 1, . . . , n.






pa∗(i) ≤ 0 for k = 1, . . . , n, hence, pa∗ ≺w pb∗.






`(i) − pa∗(i) ≤
k∑
i=1




for k = 1, . . . , n, or equivalently s(Πa, `, c, γ) ≺w s(Πb, `, c, γ).
Proof of Proposition 2.3.2. Because (Π, `, c, γ) is unbalancing, it must hold that



























































≥ `(j+1) − `(j),
























= `(j+1) − `(j) (A.15)
for j = 1, . . . , n − 1. By the assumption of the lemma, at least one node repays its










i,k + c(k) ≥ `(k) for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n},
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where we recall that p∗µi is the clearing payment made by node j if `(i) = `j. Together







− `(j) ≥ 0 for j = 1, . . . , n,.
But this means that p∗ = ` = `∧ (`Π + c). Hence, it must hold that s(Π, `, c, γ) = 0.
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APPENDIX B. CHAPTER 3 PROOF OF UNIQUENESS OF
CLEARING PAYMENT VECTOR
Proof of Lemma 3.2.1. Consider a generic epoch t. We need to show that there ex-
ists a unique solution pt to the system of equalities in the absolute priority constraint,
















i}, if dti = 0,
0, if dti = 1.
Let i ∈ {k ∈ {1, . . . , n}| dtk = 0}. Since ot is specified, cti, and vti are known, then we



















Since the subgraph induced by set {k ∈ {1, . . . , n}|dtk = 0} is regular, it was shown
in [Eisenberg and Noe(2001)] that the above system of equations has a unique solution,
pti.
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APPENDIX C. CHAPTER 3 ENTROPY MAXIMIZATION METHOD
Denote the set of core and peripheral banks by C and P respectively. We next describe
how we apply the entropy maximization method of [Upper and Worms(2004)] to
generate the matrix of interbank liabilities. This consists of the following steps:
Step 1. Distribute the total liabilities to the three blocks in the blockmodel. Denote the
total amount that a bank i ∈ C borrows from the banks in C and P by ˜`CCi and
˜`CP
i respectively. Furthermore, the total amount which a bank i ∈ P borrows
from C is denoted by ˜`PCi . Denote the total amount lent by a bank i ∈ C to C and
P by a˜CCi and a˜CPi respectively, and the total lending amount of a bank i ∈ P to
C by a˜PCi . Following the guideline that the size of interbank loans between core
banks is 50 times as large as the lending amount from peripheral to core banks






























i for i ∈ P .








































Step 3. Generate the matrices of relative liabilities within each block, denoted by ΠˆCC,
ΠˆCP and ΠˆPC. Assume the normalized lending and borrowing amounts of each
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j for i, j ∈ C, which amounts to




j for i ∈ C, j ∈ P




j for i ∈ P , j ∈ C.
Step 4. Adjust the matrix of relative liabilities in the complete block, i.e. the core-to-core
block. Notice that the elements on the main diagonal of ΠˆCC can be non-zero.
We use the RAS algorithm, given in [Bacharach(1965)], and derive ΠˆCC∗ so that
the sum of rows and columns of ΠˆCC∗ are equal to the corresponding quantities in
ΠˆCC, the elements on the main diagonal of ΠˆCC∗ are zeros, and the cross entropy
between ΠˆCC and ΠˆCC∗ is minimized. The RAS algorithm consists of a sequence
of iterations yielding successive refinements of the matrix ΠˆCC∗. Let Diag(ψ) be
the diagonal matrix with vector ψ on the diagonal. In the initialization step, we








, i.e to the matrix ΠˆCC whose




















Iterating Π(m) according to the above relation , we obtain ΠˆCC∗ = limm→∞Π(m).
Step 5. Combine ΠˆCC∗, ΠˆCP , and ΠˆPC into Π˜t such that the sum of each row in Π˜t equals
1, and the loans between core banks to be 50 times as large as the lending amount








0 · · · 0
0 1∑n
j=1 f2,j
· · · 0
...
. . . . . .
...
0 · · · · · · 1∑n
j=1 fn,j
 ,
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